


JPRS-SEA-93-013
16 September 1993



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JPRS Report

East Asia

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JPRS-SEA-93-013

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Opposition to Sihanouk Appears in Press

93SE0268A Bangkok THE NATION in English
23 Aug 93 p a5

[Excerpts] Cambodia's press has published an article critical of Prince Norodom Sihanouk in what appeared to be the first dissent from the head of state's policies since he returned to the Cambodian capital in November 1991.

The article in the daily *Rasmey Kampuchea* (*Light of Cambodia*) last week reported on a critical letter written by a dissenter in France who heads the anti-Sihanouk "Movement for Khmer Liberty."

It quoted the letter as saying that the prince was "using dictatorial means" in negotiating with the Khmer Rouge in order to bring them into the national community. [passage omitted]

"To negotiate with the Khmer Rouge to share power in the government, this is not what the Cambodian people want. It is outside of the democratic process," the newspaper quoted the letter as saying.

"If the prince wants to do anything like that, he must ask for the opinion of the people first. If not, he is using dictatorial means outside of the Paris peace agreement," it said. [passage omitted]

"Prince Sihanouk has been associated with killers since 1970," when he was deposed and joined with the Khmer Rouge in the revolutionary struggle for power, the newspaper quoted.

"Sihanouk always accused others for the problems of Cambodia. He never accepts his faults," it said.

Newspapers in Cambodia, while becoming more liberal since the UN-run election in May, nonetheless maintain a fairly close relationship with government policy.

But Cambodian intellectuals have been complaining more openly about Prince Sihanouk since the election, and many have been repeating a phrase that links Cambodian tradition to the constantly changing decisions of the prince.

Following his policies, they say, is like following the twisting and twirling hands of Cambodian classical dancers.

POLITICAL

Comments on Trial of Students Involved in 'Golput'*93SE0231A Jakarta EDITOR in Indonesian
17 Jul 93 p 32*

[Article by Bakarudin: "A Flaming Resurgence"]

[Text] The general elections are over, but not for Lukas Luwarso and Poltak Ike Wibowo. The two university students are now being tried for conducting a "Golput" [election boycott] campaign before the elections of June 1992. Lukas is the primary accused, and Poltak Ike Wibowo is the secondary accused.

Soewiji, S.H. [Master of Laws], as the public prosecutor, charges that Lukas and Poltak declared enmity and uttered slander against the Government of the Republic of Indonesia. "They made their statements on National Resurgence Day (Tuesday, 20 May 1992)," Soewiji charged before the court on Saturday, 3 July, at the Semarang State Court.

The points that expressed their enmity, said Soewiji, included replacing the text of Pancasila [ideology of the Indonesian state] with a five-line poem and changing the election march to a "Golput" march.

The principles of Pancasila were changed to the following: Sole, almighty power; humanity oppressed and destroyed; Indonesian primordialism; a society led by the wisdom of hypocrisy through compulsion of the individual; social suffering by all Indonesian people.

Soewiji said the election march was changed by using statements that slander the government and state officials. The statements were: The general elections annoyed us; all the officials welcomed it; democratic rights were emasculated; we the people are not yet free.

"Thus, the activities conducted by Lukas and Poltak violated Article 154, in connection with Article 155, Paragraph 1, of the KUHP [Code of Criminal Law]," Soewiji charged.

That is the situation. Many feel that Lukas (age 26, a student at the Literature Faculty of Diponegoro University [UNDIP]) and Poltak (26, a student at the Law Faculty of Sultan Agung Islamic University [UNISULA]) have truly slipped this time. Security authorities have been watching these two activists for a long time. Not many people were surprised when Lukas and Poltak were detained by authorities following a Readiness Rally at the Literature Faculty on 20 May 1992. It is a fact that the two of them have several times staged actions—and expressed criticism—against the government. Concern by the authorities was natural, because the Readiness Rally program received much attention from UNDIP students.

However, both Lukas and Poltak told EDITOR after the rally that they did not feel that their activity had slandered or opposed the state. "Did we urge anyone to revolt?" Lukas asked. According to Poltak, the criticism that was voiced had also been sounded by legislators in the Parliament [DPR]. He cited the issues of TV fees and cloves marketing as examples. "Thus, in what way did I slander the state?" he asked.

Nevertheless, Prof. Dr. Muladi, S.H., professor at the UNDIP Law Faculty, felt the Readiness Rally was not a strategic thing to do. They were mistaken, Muladi said, if they thought the authorities would not take action against activities on campus. The campus is not a state within a state. With respect to the Indonesian political structure, "Golput" is clearly deemed outside the system. It is true that "Golput" is a personal right, but this right cannot be separated from applicable morality and law. "Thus, a declaration of a 'Golput' position means opposing ABRI [Indonesian Armed Forces], the government, and political parties," Muladi stated.

Neither UNDIP nor UNISSULA, where the students belonged, took their hands off. This was evidenced by the fact that both students received legal help from their universities. "Before there is a court decision, I will not take any academic action," said Prof. Dr. Moeljono S. Trastotenojo, UNDIP rector.

Darmanto Jatman, chairman of the Communications Science Department in the UNDIP Sociology and Political Science Faculty, said that trying Lukas and Poltak was not the appropriate way to teach them, however. It is not certain that the two of them will learn their lesson. "They must not be made even more militant. As 'shock therapy,' however, it may be beneficial by making students do more thinking when they want to do something wrong," Darmanto said. That is true. "If they are found guilty, there must be other approaches. It is not enough merely to put them in prison," Muladi asserted.

Suharto Approves Portuguese Friendship Group Plan*93SE0238A Jakarta BISNIS INDONESIA
in Indonesian 21 Jul 93 p 16*

[Text] Jakarta (BISNIS)—President Suharto approves and welcomes the Portuguese initiative to form a friendship association between the two countries, thus offering hope that the people of Portugal will better understand the integration of East Timor into Indonesia.

"An Indonesia-Portugal Friendship Association (IPFA) is clearly a good thing, and it is now being studied by Foreign Minister Ali Alatas and Minister of State and State Secretary Mardiono," said Roving Ambassador Lopez da Cruz after reporting to President Suharto at Freedom Palace yesterday on the results of his recent visit to the European Parliament.

European Parliament circles recently formed the European Parliament-Indonesia Friendship Association

(EPIFA). The association's members are the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and Britain, which are sympathetic to Indonesia.

Initiative

In Portugal, he said, the initiative for establishing the friendship association came from private circles, such as businessmen, intellectuals, and journalists. "If this comes about, we will naturally welcome it, but it is at their own initiative, entirely from Portugal."

The president's response was good, and he gave approval to Lopez to meet with international figures, headed by the overseas president of Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor [FRETILIN], Abilio Araujo.

"It was a proposal from Portugal. They want to meet with us. The political status of East Timor will naturally not be discussed in the meeting, but there will be discussion of their participation in developing the province, especially in education."

Ambassador da Cruz also reported on a concept called "Efforts Toward a Breakthrough in Resolving East Timor Integration in International Forums." There was also the subject of meetings between prominent figures from East Timor, both those who are for integration and those who are overseas, namely those who have never accepted integration.

He also reported on preparations by some East Timor community leaders—small monarchs—who are to be invited to the 17 August celebration at Freedom Palace.

"They will receive a red and white flag directly from the president, and assistance will be suited to their needs," da Cruz said.

Breakthrough

He acknowledged that the EPIFA was a very effective breakthrough for Indonesia, because it has people from the European Parliament itself. The proof came in May when the European Parliament rejected the Portugal-sponsored resolution on East Timor, particularly about Xanana.

"Portugal said Indonesia had no right to try Xanana, but Portugal was defeated decisively by 129 pro-Indonesia votes against the resolution to 82 in favor, and one abstention. Therefore, it is very important for us to form that type of association in Portugal, as reported to the president."

Legal Aid Society Faces Change

93SE0245A Jakarta *TEMPO* in Indonesian
17 Jul 93 p 40

[Text] Garuda has long been the leader but in the end must step down, too. This is the fate of Abdul Hakim Garuda Nusantara. On Monday of this week [12 July],

the director of the Board of Management of the Indonesian Legal Aid Society Foundation (YLBHI) completed his second term in leadership. In other words, he was required to step down. Six people will be competing to replace him, among them Mulyana W. Kusumah (his deputy) and Nursyahbani Katjasungkana (director of the Jakarta Legal Aid Society [LBH]).

As of this week, however, a replacement has not yet been appointed. Therefore, Garuda's term has been extended by two weeks, until 24 July. The Board of Trustees, which has the biggest voice in deciding the chairman and managers of the YLBHI, has not been successful in selecting Garuda's replacement. The 21 board members include Soekardjo Hariadi (chairman), Adnan Buyung Nasution, and Ali Sadikin. Criticism has therefore been hurled at them. "They do not know the field despite their great power," said a senior YLBHI director.

While a meeting of the Board of Trustees was being held on 3 July, the Jakarta LBH office was visited by protesters calling themselves the "Group for Democratizing the LBH." They used the common practice of displaying posters, which demanded that the LBH democratize itself. In Bandung on Thursday of last week [8 July], 10 LBH employees expressed their desire for major change within the LBH. "The Board of Directors and the Board of Trustees must be elected by the membership. Thus, regional people must be involved," said Effendi Saman, one of the leaders of the Bandung action.

In its 22d year, the LBH has 10 branches and three project bases, i.e., in East Timor, Lampung, and Aceh. Its work is not merely defending suspects in court, but they have expanded to projects that affect the community. The LBH handles four areas: land, labor, the environment, and crime—especially political.

One of the things the LBH did in the last six years was to defend ITB [Bandung Institute of Technology] students who demonstrated in front of Minister Rudini in 1989. The society also defended a student from UGM [Gadjah Mada University], Yogyakarta, in a criminal subversion case, in which he was charged with distributing a "prohibited book." In the latter case, the LBH was not successful in sparing college students from imprisonment or revocation of student status.

The LBH also helped evicted residents of Tanah Merah, Jakarta. In cooperation with other LSM's [community self-help organizations], the LBH persuaded residents to demonstrate at the Parliament [DPR]. In the field of environmental law, the LBH has been able to display its presence, despite casualties. While defending residents of Singosari, East Java, who fled in fear of shock by high voltage, one of the society's attorneys was arrested on charges of inciting unrest among the residents. The outcome was different in 1990 when it defended residents of Tapak, Semarang. With two other LSM's, the LBH was successful in obtaining compensation for residents from industries causing pollution.

While Garuda has been in leadership, there has also been a problem of dwindling funds. The routine budget is now about 1.2 billion rupiah per year, almost 75 percent of which comes from other countries, including Dutch LSM's, Netherlands Organization for International Aid [NOVIB], and United States Agency for International Development [USAID]. It is probable that this amount will decline in the future, seeing that European funds are now flowing more to Eastern Europe. "We are trying to reduce our dependence on outside sources," said Mulyana W. Kusumah, deputy director of the LBH. It appears, therefore, that the LBH must change, both in activities and in organization.

Batam Imposes Curfew

93SE0245B Jakarta TEMPO in Indonesian
17 Jul 93 p 41

[Text] There is a curfew in Batam. At the end of last week, young people were not visiting Bukit Senyum to pass the night as they usually do. At 1700 hours, the Padang rice stalls at Pasar Jodoh closed quickly, as did the cigarette kiosks. Police and military vehicles could be seen going around on patrol.

This restrictive situation came about after word spread of a fight between two groups of youths at the beginning of last week. The situation began with deductions taken from the wages of a young man named John, a native of Flores and a security guard at the Marina City Golf Course. His boss's reason for doing this was that John did not come to work and was accused of stealing 10 light bulbs. John then suspected Monsirwan, a tax driver from Bukittinggi who had the boss's confidence, of leaking the information. "So I hit Mon," John told TEMPO.

In the evening of that day, Monsirwan brought about 30 taxi drivers, natives of his area, to John's house at Batu Aji. John happened not to be at home, but the taxi drivers threatened to kidnap and kill John. These threats kindled the anger of John's friends in the neighborhood. After that, they stopped every taxi and smashed its glass.

The flame of unrest grew, and the police arrived Thursday morning to reconcile the parties. In several places, however, there were separate incidents of fights with sharp instruments. The climax came Thursday night. Hundreds of taxi drivers attacked John's neighborhood of Batu Aji. The attack was resisted. The residents were apparently ready to fight with machetes, bamboo spears, and arrows.

It is not clear how many casualties there were, but the heated atmosphere and suspicion spread rapidly. At Batu Aji, for example, everyone passing by was asked, "Where are you from?" Every youth appeared on his toes.

There were also rumors of people disappearing or being killed. There was even a report that natives of the respective areas came to Batam from nearby islands. Security forces, including a platoon of marines from Tanjung Pinang, arrived to control the situation. The

chief of the local police precinct, Lieutenant Colonel Gawat Suyono, told reporters that the two sides have been reconciled.

Ministers, Others Call for PDI Party Unity

93SE0248A Jakarta SUARA PEMBARUAN
in Indonesian 22 Jul 93 pp 1, 16

[Text] Medan, 22 Jul—Minister of Defense and Security [MENHANKAM] Edi Sudradjat stated that, in all frankness, the people want to see unity and oneness in the Indonesian Democratic Party [PDI] so that its struggle will have only one orientation, namely the national interest.

The MENHANKAM said this Wednesday night, 21 July, in his speech to participants in the Fourth PDI Congress at the Haji Pangkalan Masyur Dormitory in Medan. The MENHANKAM should have presented his speech at 1930 hours, but because of a five-hour sit-in that began at 1600 hours in the meeting hall used by the congress, the MENHANKAM's speech could not begin until 1015 hours, after the group that had taken over the meeting hall was ordered to leave.

Armed Forces Commander [PANGAB] General Feisal Tanjung and Minister of Home Affairs [MENDAGRI] Moh. Yogie S.M., who gave their speeches at the same location before the sit-in took place, also stressed that the PDI should establish oneness and unity.

Desired by Nation

In the MENHANKAM's speech, which PDI leaders said was substantial and unequivocal and needed no interpretation, he pointed out that the professional life and service of cadres of national development is for the sake of their nation's progress and success.

If these development cadres happen to be members of political parties, that progress and success becomes the focus of the party's struggle. "Therefore, the formation and maturity of cadres is not to be 'party-centric' alone, but must be in the framework of a national concept," he said.

He said PDI cadres therefore have the attention and interest of the entire nation.

The MENHANKAM said further that the PDI is national property and this fact should guide each member. In other words, the entire Indonesian nation wants the PDI to be a dependable political force.

"The PDI is not the property merely of its members, as though they can do anything they wish without regard to the interest and concern of society," he said.

He said it is true that the PDI's problems come from within itself, but that does not close the door to society's interest in an appropriate resolution of those problems for the sake of preventing many side effects. He asked,

therefore, that the interest of society, including that of the government, should not be interpreted as intervention in its internal affairs. It should be interpreted as love for the PDI and a recognition of its unconditional existence in the national political constellation.

The evaluation of our respective positions toward the spirit behind the founding of the organization is a central effort toward the resolution of internal problems. From those positions, we can get a clear idea as to "what is going on within ourselves."

Nevertheless, he said, when friction occurs between groups it is common to look first for the ringleader rather than for the essence of the problem. "Such a tendency often creates a single ringleader, namely the leader of the organization involved."

He said this is quite understandable, since it is proper to ask an organization's leader to be accountable for everything that happens within the organization. Also, it often happens that an organization's leader is not strong enough to bear the size and authority of his position, causing him to slip into situations contrary to the spirit behind the founding of the organization.

Fragile Discipline

MENDAGRI Moh. Yogie S.M. said earlier that the PDI and the other sociopolitical organizations should be pioneers of renewal in national politics and in the mechanism of political life for all citizens.

According to the MENDAGRI, because all PDI members and sympathizers have pinned their hopes on the PDI that it will express their aspirations, they should not be disappointed by ambitions for power, because political morality means that power is for developing both material and spiritual prosperity.

He said that many observers have come to the conclusion that weakness in the political leadership of civil forces is a result of fragile organizational discipline. Such fragility of discipline occurs because, when people fight for an idea, they often are so enthusiastic that they forget larger benefits and interests, or they are driven by interests that differ from their principles.

The PDI should emphasize consultation and consensus as the way to resolve internal organizational problems and should always refer to provisions of the party's constitution in order to establish unity and oneness in the PDI family.

"A 'win-win approach' needs to be used seriously as a replacement for the 'win-lose' approach, so that every decision will benefit everyone," the MENDAGRI said.

He asked that, to unite party members, the party elect a top leadership of quality and mature outlook, a leadership able to lead the party to effective communication with other sociopolitical organizations.

'Legally Flawed'

PANGAB Feisal Tanjung, who also gave a speech at the PDI Congress, said that Indonesian Armed Forces [ABRI] has no problem with anyone who may be elected to lead and manage the PDI during the next term, as long as he is chosen by consensus of the congress in compliance with the PDI constitution and bylaws and has broad support from PDI members.

The PANGAB emphasized that ABRI, like the government, does not want to intervene in the decision-making process of the congress, because that would not be consistent with the values of the Pancasila Democracy we are now developing.

The PANGAB did not mention in his speech the legal question connected with the PDI leadership. When a reporter asked him about the matter after the speech, however, he stressed that the statement he made some time ago about being "legally flawed" still stands. "The point is, my statement still stands—note, still stands," he said as he entered his car.

He also recalled how the Third PDI Congress in 1986 was marked by things that showed how difficult it is to maintain unity and oneness, of which ongoing dynamic stability is a characteristic. "Unity also needs to be renewed in ABRI and in the extended ABRI family, where life is closely knit and there is discipline," the PANGAB said.

ECONOMIC

Reportage on Antipoverty Efforts

Home Affairs Department

93SE0242A Jakarta ANGKATAN BERSENJATA
in Indonesian 21 Jul 93 p 1

[Text] Jakarta (ANGKATAN BERSENJATA)—Minister of Home Affairs Yogie S. Memet declared that efforts to eradicate poverty will be difficult if based only on economic laws, and especially if the matter is left entirely up to the free market economic system.

Yogie made this statement during the opening ceremony of the national-level working meeting of village community organizations (LMD's) at Cisarua, Bogor, Tuesday morning [20 July].

He said poverty can also be categorized as structural, because poverty is a reflection of the low economic status, or low "echelon," of a community marked by very limited skills, access to capital, and "power," such as for setting prices on things they produce.

Therefore, he continued, efforts clearly will not be sufficient if they merely provide facilities and infrastructure, because more extensive efforts are needed. "For the long term, such efforts can be made through the development of human resources, while in the short term focus should

be on economic activities that are directly productive, as appropriate to local conditions," he stated.

According to Yogie, another matter that is important in eradicating poverty is the involvement of the private sector, in both the acquisition of capital and the development of management. The role of the private sector and community self-help organizations (LSM's) in eradicating poverty and in their relationship to LMD's requires regulations and procedures that are appropriate for current demands.

At another point in his speech, Minister of Home Affairs Yogie S.M. said that in facing the Second Long-Term Development Phase (PJPT II) the development of human resources is needed, as is the development of training systems and procedures for heads of governmental matters at the subdistrict level. This should later be continued down to the LMD level. "Such training needs to be adapted to regional conditions," he emphasized.

As for development of the village economy, he said various steps must be taken in this exploratory [as published] stage, such as the development of village enterprises. "If we have state-owned business enterprises (BUMN's) at the national level and regional government-owned business enterprises [BUMD's] at the regional level, it is not too much to form village-owned business enterprises," he stated.

Warsito Rasman, director general of general government and regional autonomy of the Ministry of Home Affairs, said the national-level LMD working meeting this time has taken the theme, "Through the National-Level LMD Working Meeting, We Improve the Quality of Village Government as Developer of Human Resources for the Success of PJPT II." "This time, there are at least 160 participants from 27 provinces," he declared.

With that theme, it is hoped that the working meeting can resolve obstacles in the context of establishing and strengthening village governments so that they can increasingly serve and protect the community, inspire community initiative and participation in development, and conduct the functions of village government efficiently and effectively.

Also present on this occasion were Jakarta Special Capital Area Governor Surjadi Soedirdja, West Java Governor Nuriana, and delegates from National Development Planning Board [BAPPENAS], the Department of Finance, the Department of Transmigration and Clearing of Forests, the People's Bank of Indonesia, and the Department of Posts and Telecommunications.

Nongovernmental Organizations

93SE0243B Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian
22 Jul 93 p 2

[Text] Jakarta (KOMPAS)—National Development Planning Board [BAPPENAS] is involving a number of self-help organizations [LSM's] in fighting poverty. In

eradicating poverty, BAPPENAS will carry out the Poor Village Presidential Instructions [INPRES] (IDM) Program in cooperation with LSM's.

Prof. Dr. Mubyarto, assistant minister of state for national planning and development in the field of even distribution and elimination of poverty, said this on Wednesday, 21 July.

Mubyarto declined to explain the factors considered by BAPPENAS in deciding to cooperate with self-help organizations LSM's because, he said, he did not know them himself, despite his capacity as assistant minister. He recommended that the question be addressed directly to the LSM's or the minister.

Meanwhile, Zumrotin K. Soesilo, chairman of the Indonesian Consumer Affairs Institute, also would not comment when asked for confirmation. He admitted he did not know the government's reasons for involving LSM's. "This is merely a step toward embracing them, but nothing more. Ask the minister directly," Zumrotin said.

Through Banks

According to Mubyarto, the eradication of poverty will be done by directly channeling IDM funds to villages through banks designated by the government. IDM funds will be given directly to members of the community as working capital and not for the development of village infrastructure. In this matter, LSM activists will help in the channeling of IDM funds. The LSM's will act, not in their bureaucratic capacity, but as independent oversight organizations.

In his working paper, "National Policy for the Eradication of Poverty in the Villages," which he presented at a workshop on "Improvement of Food Supply Resilience to Fight Poverty" at the office of the Logistics Affairs Board on 17 July, Mubyarto explained that IDM should not be equated to funding, but should be looked on as containing general guidance on programs for agricultural and village development, decentralization, regional autonomy, and village community participation.

Mubyarto was not able to give any information on the amount of IDM funding and distribution or on poverty maps, however. He promised that information on these matters will be ready in two weeks, because they now being discussed by the Central Bureau of Statistics, BAPPENAS, and Village Development [BANGDES].

LSM's Prepared

The government's action has been received positively by a number of LSM's. For that reason, the LSM's are ready to help and to carry out the government's IDM program. The LSM's cannot yet guarantee success in a quantitative way, however.

"Because the present number of poor people is much greater than the number of LSM's, it will be difficult to implement the IDM program. Nevertheless, we will strive to resolve the problem by involving field extension

personnel, trained volunteers, and volunteer college graduates in each region," said Drs. Bambang Ismawan, M.S., principal director of Bina Swadaya.

Bambang noted that poverty is not caused by lack of capital, but by problems of opportunity for jobs and for doing business. Therefore, the government must

encourage the creation of new jobs by giving support and incentives to every effort made by the business world and the LSM's.

Bambang explained that the LSM's greatly appreciate the concept of the IDM as a movement to wipe out poverty. Because members of the community will be given opportunity to participate in the movement, they will be able to escape from poverty.

POLITICAL

Philippine Official Says Sabah Claim No Barrier

93SE0250B Kuala Lumpur UTUSAN MALAYSIA
in Malay 23 Jul 93 p 5

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, 22 Jul—The issue of the Philippine claim to Sabah should not be a hindrance to the expansion of bilateral relations that have existed for so long, said Philippine Foreign Secretary Roberto R. Romulo.

He said the problem needs to be resolved gradually and need not hurt bilateral relations between Malaysia and the Philippines.

He said the Philippines is trying to settle the issue while at the same time proceeding with economic cooperation with Malaysia.

"There has been progress and positive development toward achieving a consensus on the claim to Sabah that has dragged on for 30 years," he said at a press conference at the Foreign Ministry today after signing a memorandum of understanding on the creation of the Malaysia-Philippines Joint Commission.

Foreign Minister Datuk Abdullah Ahmad Badawi signed the memorandum for Malaysia, while Romulo signed for the Philippines.

Romulo said the Senate and the Executive Joint Advisory Council of the Philippine Government have almost reached agreement on the issue.

He said the council has also officially agreed to deal with the issue, which the council feels should be finally resolved.

He added that the issue of the Philippine claim to Sabah will also be an important item on the agenda of the first meeting of the Malaysia-Philippines Joint Commission next December.

He said resolution of the Philippine claim to Sabah needs to be given priority over other matters.

Romulo said Prime Minister Datuk Sri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad and President Ramos discussed the subject when the Philippine president visited Malaysia last January.

Abdullah also said that the Joint Commission will be the most appropriate forum for the two countries to discuss a variety of issues that involve bilateral relations.

"It will also be the best channel for resolving any problems that arise, besides being a mechanism for dialogue and discussion on various issues," he asserted.

Names of UMNO Members 'Mysteriously' Disappear

93SE0250A Kuala Lumpur BERITA HARIAN
in Malay 27 Jul 93 p 2

[Text] Johor Baharu, 26 Jul—A. Jalil Ahmad, who as a candidate for president of the Johor Baharu Division of United Malays National Organization [UMNO] is challenging Datuk Shahrir Abdul Samad, charges that the number of UMNO members in his division has been decreasing following the mysterious disappearance of the member lists of a number of branches from the computer, including branches that have not yet held conferences.

Jalil said his investigation found that membership in his UMNO division has now declined from 13,000 to 9,000.

He said that most of the branches that were victims in this incident are those deemed to be "opponents" of the UMNO leadership in the division.

Jalil, who is also president of the Taman Century Branch, said that after conducting a detailed investigation he has evidence related to the disappearance of the member lists.

"Our investigation found that 120 members of the Larkin Jaya Timur UMNO Branch have disappeared from the computer, and of the 179 members of the Mustika Branch only 50 names remain on the computer.

"We also have proof that more than 30 members of the Belantik UMNO Branch who have paid their dues have disappeared from computer lists.

"Our investigation also found that the name of the secretary of one UMNO branch is among those lost from computer lists," he said today.

In addition, he charged that the member lists of other UMNO branches that have not held conferences are also casualties, since they could not be found on the computer.

Using the Taman Nong Chik UMNO Branch as an example, he said 119 member names have disappeared from the list, including a leader and a former leader of the branch.

In connection with this, he asks that UMNO Secretary-General Datuk Mohamed Rahmat act immediately and provide special guidance on handling the mystery of the missing names.

"Immediate action by top UMNO leadership is necessary in view of the hands-off attitude the administration of the Johor Baharu Division took when the problem was presented.

"They also claimed that only Federal UMNO had the authority to investigate the incident.

"The disappearance of the lists of UMNO members in the Johor Baharu Division is a repressive action against the members involved and is contrary to the party's principles and struggle," he said.

ECONOMIC

Reportage on Fulfilling 2020 Plan

Outline of Key Elements

93SE0259A Kuala Lumpur UTUSAN MALAYSIA
in Malay 24 Jul 93 pp 1, 2

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, 23 Jul—Political stability, the role of administrators and the private sector, and effective organization are three factors that represent the key to success of national objectives in fulfilling the 2020 Plan.

Prime Minister Datuk Sri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad declared that if we have these three things, our hopes are bright for becoming a developed country by the year 2020.

"We need political stability. We need the Malaysian Alliance, and we need disciplined organizations," he said.

The prime minister said this in his speech at an Administrative and Diplomatic Services Association (PPTD) dinner here tonight.

He said understanding and cooperation among a country's administrators, corporate leaders, and government leaders, namely political leaders, elected by the people are very important to efforts to develop the country.

"Leaders entrusted by the people to manage national affairs need always to be committed and creative in handling every challenge," he said.

Dr. Mahathir stressed that they must be expert and diligent in handling their jobs and must have vision and "sense of mission" as they work.

"Their primary compensation is the success they achieve in doing their jobs, and such success will be demonstrated and measured by the country's growth," Dr. Mahathir said.

The prime minister explained that there is much a person needs to know and do to achieve an objective for himself or the country.

He said that although everything is important, some things are more important than others. Political stability is one of those things that is important to a country and for which knowledge and effort is needed.

"We can see how a country with political instability is unable to achieve progress, despite other suitable factors

"A country may be rich in natural resources, intelligence, and skills, but if it is politically unstable, all those assets will be in vain," he said.

On the other hand, Dr. Mahathir said, if there is political stability but a shortage of assets, development may be achieved anyway.

In Malaysia, the prime minister said, there are many factors that could threaten the country's political stability.

"The people realize that politics for politics' sake is pointless, however. Therefore, ideological zeal, factions, and fanatical support for leaders do not interfere with tranquility and national stability. Compromise and tolerance are our practices," the prime minister said further.

He added that although managers and administrators are not directly involved in politics, the effect of their efforts and management can determine whether politics will be stable or not.

Generally, Dr. Mahathir said, countries that are managed well and are successful economically are more easily kept politically stable.

"Therefore, it is clear that politics and the economy cannot be separated. In fact, they are mutually dependent.

"Managers and administrators should understand the close links between these two areas and thus try to create good administration that helps economic development and political stability," he said.

As to the second factor in the success of a country, namely the role of administrators and the private sector, Dr. Mahathir said that under the old tradition of government, administrators merely administered everything, including the private sector.

Thus, the prime minister said, the attitude of administrators toward the private sector was that of an administrator or enforcer of laws and regulations.

"Laws and regulations were emphasized rather than the interests of the private sector," he said.

Therefore, the prime minister said, if the role of the private sector in economic development is recognized, a government that wants to develop its country should see to it that the private sector functions well.

"For that reason, cooperation among the government, administrators, and the private sector is proper, because that will help to create a good business climate," he said.

The prime minister emphasized that the concept of the Malaysian Alliance is founded on this realization. Although irregularities may occur, the benefit of cooperation outweighs the negative things that may happen.

"We cannot quantitatively evaluate the results of carrying out the concept of the Malaysian Alliance, but the fact is that Malaysian economic growth is greater now than when there was no such concept.

"This concept, or cooperation between the public and private sectors, has considerably contributed to national development," the prime minister explained.

Dr. Mahathir said that the advantage of Western countries in the past was that they were more organized in their administration, at both national and military forces levels.

Therefore, he said, all affairs moved in an orderly and expeditious way.

"This organization factor is what enabled Western countries with small forces to subdue, control, and administer territories in Africa, America, and Asia that had such large populations," said Dr. Mahathir.

The prime minister explained that the government today realizes the importance of organization and order.

Independence

He said: "By giving order to organization, we were able to seize our independence and establish an effective administration."

He said it is clear that with more skilled and effective administration, a country will be more successful. Administrators and managers are aware of this fact.

"Efforts to improve organizational structure and give order to management have no limits. A country that wants to be successful needs to review constantly the structure and management of its administrative organization," Dr. Mahathir said.

The prime minister declared that with modern equipment, management has become easier and faster. New approaches and repeated training are important things for improving administrative effectiveness.

"The arrangement of the hierarchy is important, but because hierarchy without discipline is meaningless, administration needs discipline to be successful. Discipline means that the organization is more important than individual members," he said.

Regarding the 2020 Plan, he said that among the world's countries only Malaysia has a firm and specific objective.

"We have decided that we want to be a developed country by the year 2020. Determining that objective was important because it helps us to plan and organize steps toward the objective," he added.

He said the fact that everything is determined by God does not mean the people of this country cannot decide their direction and objectives.

Skilled Workers Needed

93SE02594 Kuala Lumpur UTUSAN MALAYSIA
in Malay 22 Jul 93 p 9

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, 21 Jul—Malaysia needs about a million skilled workers to accommodate the needs of various industrial, manufacturing, and engineering sectors as the year 2020 approaches.

Studies find that this need can be met only if the private sector is involved in managing technical and vocational training for the creation of more skilled workers.

Deputy Minister for Public Works Kerk Choo Ting said the government is encouraging members of the public, especially students, to expand their basic knowledge of technical skills.

He said the government therefore is providing training facilities at several training centers, namely the MARA [Council of Trust for Indigenous Peoples] Training Institute, Giat MARA, the Youth Training Center, the Industrial Training Institute (ITI), and polytechnic institutes throughout the country.

"Because government-sponsored training centers that function to create more skilled workers for this country are not sufficient, the cooperation of the private sector is greatly needed.

"The future development of a country, particularly as the year 2000 approaches, depends on skilled workers. Therefore, the people of this country should increase their capabilities in this sector so that the government's objective of making Malaysia a developed country will be achieved," he said.

He said this to reporters as he commented on the need for skilled workers while visiting the Federal Institute of Technology (FIT) today.

As examples, he noted that Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and the countries of Europe were developed because they have many skilled workers and experts in various technical fields.

"The country needs the participation of the private sector in its efforts to create more skilled workers and should follow the example of the FIT, because the institute has been successful in producing skilled workers with quality," he said.

Meanwhile, Abdullah Fauzi Ibrahim, the FIT's manager of student affairs, said graduates of the institute have bright prospects for jobs with good wages.

He said they face no problems in finding work, because records show that 100 percent of the students who graduate from the FIT are offered jobs by the private sector.

"Almost all of the students who complete their approximately six months of study will be offered work in more than 30 fields in the private sector throughout the country.

"Some private companies are willing to offer scholarships to FIT students to ensure that they work for those

companies when they finish their training as engineers and specialists in machinery, electricity, or computers," he said.

Abdullah said the country needs more skilled workers to speed government efforts to make Malaysia a developed country.

LACC Approves 35 Peso Salary Increase

93SE0232B Manila BALITA in Tagalog 17 Jul 93 p 3

[Article by Maricar Evangelista: "35 Peso Salary Increase Approved"]

[Text] The Labor Advisory and Consultative Council (LACC) gave support to the request of the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP) from the government regarding the salary increase for current workers.

The LACC not only agreed with and supported the TUCP on the 35 peso salary increase, but also recommended that the increase be larger. It suggested that the increase should be as high as the cost of living increase, or should be equal to the poverty level, as declared by the National Economic and Development Authority or NEDA.

Based on their studies and inquiries, NEDA established the current poverty level as 7,350 pesos for a family of six.

The current salary is so low, and the 35 peso increase requested by the TUCP is inadequate.

The TUCP stated that it is now high time that the government raise the workers' salaries—they are presently experiencing extreme hardships. It also stated that if the government aims to increase productivity, then it must offer assistance to the workers through salary increases.

Rebels Desiring Amnesty Must Register

93SE0232A Manila BALITA in Tagalog 20 Jul 93 p 3

[Article by Bert De Guzman]

[Text] All rebel-returnees who were members of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New Peoples Army-National Democratic Front [CPP-NPA-NDF], Moro National Liberation Front [MNLF], Moro Islamic Liberation Front [MILF], and the Bangsa Moro Army must register again on 21 and 22 July in order to qualify for amnesty.

This was announced yesterday by the National Reconciliation and Development Council (NRDC) as part of what is called physical inventory of the rebels, as stated in Executive Order No. 88 signed by the President on 12 May 1992

Attorney Alberto Bernardo, director of the NRDC, disclosed the location of the registration centers in Metro Manila as follows: Maharlika Village Police Station in Taguig; the Islamic Center at 845 Palanca St. in Quiapo, Manila; and the Philippine Information Agency on Visayas Avenue in Quezon City. Bernardo was a guest on the program entitled "Ugnayan sa Shangrila" ("Connections in Shangrila") sponsored by the Philippine Information Agency [PIA].

As to the rebel-returnees outside the jurisdiction of Metro-Manila, they must contact their local officials in Philippine National Police [PNP] stations and in the Philippine Information Agency offices of the places where they are residing.

POLITICAL

PULO Organization; Officials Comment on South

Police Chief on Intelligence Efforts

93SE0254A Bangkok NAE0 NA in Thai 8 Aug 93 p 10

[Interview with Provincial Police Region 4 Commander Police Lieutenant General Kraisuk Sinsuk by NAE0 NA; place and date not given]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [NAEO NA] Why was there a police intelligence failure? Even though it was known which group was active, officials failed to block them.

[Kraisuk] As for the burning of those schools by this group, we know that they have about 50-60 men and that they are active in the rural areas. Their activities should not have escaped the attention of officials. But what happened this time was very strange. In the past, whenever a group of people tried to take action, even if it was a group of just eight-nine people, we knew what they planned to do and where. We don't think that there was an intelligence failure this time. The only thing is that we need to improve our intelligence capabilities. [passage omitted]

[NAEO NA] What steps will be taken to improve the police intelligence system?

[Kraisuk] We must definitely take steps to improve our intelligence system, because it has weaknesses. Because of the things that have happened, the intelligence used to develop society and suppress crime has deteriorated. If all of our intelligence capabilities are used on the security front, that will probably be a waste, because there are no longer any communist terrorists. [passage omitted]

[NAEO NA] In your view, was this the work of government officials or terrorist bandits?

[Kraisuk] I attach importance to issues concerning the state's apparatus, that is, government officials. But based on the statements made by witnesses and the analysis done by officials, it's very doubtful if government officials would have done something like that. That was done on someone's orders. Thus, those who did that were a unified group. I don't believe that government officials did that. It's very likely that that stemmed from a conflict between groups.

[NAEO NA] Are you sure that it wasn't government officials?

[Kraisuk] As I have said, sometimes, state elements may be involved. But those are just small elements. I'm sure that senior officials weren't involved. I don't think that senior officials would have joined together in ordering simultaneous acts of sabotage like that. But right now, I can't tell you for sure who was behind this.

[NAEO NA] Do the police have any clues as to who was responsible for this?

[Kraisuk] The first step in an investigation is to examine the evidence at the scene. The police are focusing their attention on some youths based on information that we received about a month ago. This intelligence report stated that a group of youths who had received good training abroad were planning on committing acts of sabotage in Thailand. Thus, we implemented a plan to foil them.

[NAEO NA] If this was the work of bandit terrorists, why isn't there any evidence indicating which group was responsible for this?

[Kraisuk] I don't understand either. In the past, whenever something like this was done, the group responsible usually sent a letter or somehow claimed responsibility for the act. Police still haven't been able to discover a motive in this case. We will have to wait until an arrest is made. Then we will know what their motive was. [passage omitted]

[NAEO NA] On the day that that happened, was there any confusion between the police and the military with respect to intelligence?

[Kraisuk] Intelligence activities are now quite dispersed. But as far as the police are concerned, we are highly unified. The military has intelligence on security issues. The police focus on crime and on catching and punishing criminals. As for the motive behind this, the military probably wants to answer this question, too. The police and the military each have their own teams working on this. [passage omitted]

Politician; Deputy Police Commander

93SE0254B Bangkok NAE0 NA in Thai 8 Aug 93 p 10

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Mr. Ariphe Utonsini, a member of parliament [MP] from Narathiwat Province and the secretary to the deputy minister of interior, Mr. Den Tomina, stated that Mr. Den traveled to Malaysia to attend the graduation of his daughter in Selangor State. While there, he met with Mr. Amin Tomina, his older brother. They discussed the burning of the schools in southern Thailand.

As for the idea of having Mr. Amin return to Thailand and become involved in politics with his younger brother, Mr. Ariphe said that he can't say whether Mr. Amin will return or not.

As for the reports that he has been involved in the recent talks with Tunku Bira Kotanila, the head of Pattani United Liberation Organization [PULO], in Cairo, Egypt, along with Mr. Wanmuhamatno Matha, the deputy president of parliament, and two military officers, he said that he doesn't know anything. The deputy president of parliament simply invited him to go along. During the meeting, all he did was serve as an interpreter in asking Bira Kotanila to surrender and

become a participant in the development of Thailand together with members of PULO. The military representatives asked Kubiro to come wage a peaceful struggle using political methods. They told him that he should run for election. He said that does not know the outcome of those talks.

Another news source in the New Aspiration Party stated that Mr. Den will meet with Sama-ae Thanam, who has been accused of being the man responsible for ordering the arson attacks on the schools, in order to show that this was not the work of bandit terrorists.

As for Mr. Amin, in the past he was an important bandit terrorist leader. And because Mr. Amin is his brother, Mr. Den failed in his bid to be appointed minister during the administration of General Prem Tinsulanon.

Police Major General Sarot Chintawiro, the deputy commissioner of Police Region 4, who has been a target of criticism by Mr. Den in this affair, said that the truth will come out. If someone does something bad, he will eventually be punished for it, either in this life or the next. But he would prefer to see them punished in this life.

"I don't want to point the finger at anyone. But once patience runs out, you will know why things are like this."

The deputy commissioner of Police Region 4 said that throughout his government career, he has followed the movements of the various bandit terrorist groups, including PULO, which is headed by Bira Kotanila, and the National Revolutionary Front [BRN], which is headed by a relative of a cabinet minister, whom he doesn't have to name.

"I can confirm that this was ordered by a single person in the movement. Once we obtain evidence, I am sure that the evidence will point to an important person in the present government. This is a concealed power. This will send shockwaves that will definitely have a great effect on politics in the country." [passage omitted]

Purported PULO Organization, Leadership

93SE0254C Bangkok MATICHON in Thai
8 Aug 93 pp 1, 2

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] At the beginning of 1984 just one year before to the collapse of the Pattani National Liberation Front [BNPP], a Special Branch Police intelligence unit sent a report to the Ministry of Interior stating that the bandit terrorists had split apart and formed a "New Group." This group had sent leaders from 13 localities in three southern provinces to the Middle East for training. After these people completed their training and returned to Thailand, they secretly began carrying on activities in the guise of religious activities.

"They are not engaged in violence but in political activities," said the report. Looking at the terrorist

movement at that time, it can be seen that only two main groups remained. One group was the National Revolutionary Front, or BRN. It originally had about 200 men and focused on carrying on activities in Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat provinces.

The second group was the Pattani United Liberation Organization or PULO. It had four main military units, which were led by Puraheng Thanam, Budo Abdul Baso, Sama-ae Thanam, to whom Bahari Khoknibong was very close, and Seng Talobuko.

At that time, PULO carried on very resolute activities. Tunku Bira Kotanila, the PULO leader, held the position of secretary general, and Amin, of the BRN, served as the "president" of the Pattani Mujahadin, which linked PULO with the BRN.

They divided their activities into three sections: 1. political activities, 2. military activities, and 3. cultural and social activities. Their headquarters was located in row house No. 12 in Osabita Subdistrict, Kota Baharu District, Kelantan State, Malaysia.

The BRN and PULO joined together at that time in order to separate the five southern provinces, that is, Songkhla, Yala, Satun, Pattani, and Narathiwat, from Thailand and form the "State of Pattani."

However, because of the conflicts among the bandit terrorists over profits, their operations were not very efficient and caused the masses to suffer. In addition, the government implemented a policy of allowing these people to participate in the development of Thailand. This led to the new line of the New Group bandit terrorists. The new political line was that carrying on military activities using forces to confront state power would be very difficult and that carrying on activities in the "red" zones would make them an easy target. Thus, their new idea was to carry on activities in "white" areas. Arong Muleng was the spearhead. Even Bahari Khoknibong, an old warlord who had stood side by side with Sama-ae Thanam in the PULO movement, agreed with this new line.

Thus, a new "PULO" came into being under the leadership of Arong Muleng. Intelligence officials don't know exactly when this new organizational structure came into being. But the people who controlled the direction of the movement included:

Arong Muleng, the head of the new PULO. Mr. Abdul Hadi Yaro, or Hadi Muno, served as secretary general. Bahari Khoknibong and Da-o served as the military commanders. They had two stalwart lieutenants, Maporlit and Rusalan.

It is this Hadi Muno, the secretary general of PULO, whom Lieutenant General Kittirattachaya, the commander of the 4th Army Region, referred to as a leading bandit terrorist whom the army has sent people to talk to. Hadi Muno is the new brains of the movement. He is

the one who devised the strategy of waging a struggle in the white areas rather than fighting in the red areas.

This political struggle is no longer aimed at separating the five southern provinces from Thailand. Rather, it is aimed at achieving various objectives based on the conditions and situation. This struggle can use our open political system as a bridge. There are politicians who will talk with them. They are the coordinators. [passage omitted]

Interior Minister Chawalit, 4th Army Commander

93SE0254D Bangkok NAO NA in Thai
2 Aug 93 pp 1, 2, 10, 12

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] General Chawalit Yongchaiyut, the minister of interior, said that he has received a report concerning the events that took place. These events took place around the same time using the same methods and for the same objectives.

"Those behind this had an objective. They certainly weren't terrorists. It is thought that this stemmed from a conflict similar to that in Sakon Nakhon Province."

The minister of interior said that he has ordered officials to be on the lookout for acts of violence. He said that he does not think that another country was behind this. As for who did this, we will have to conduct an investigation to determine that. So far, no clear motive has been established. He will go and investigate the matter personally.

"I don't know how officials could have let this happen, because this is a major issue. Officials must take responsibility. They can't let people burn down 30-40 schools like that." [passage omitted]

Lieutenant General Kittti Rattanachaya, the commander of the 4th Army Region, said that this should not have happened. What happened is very sad. He said that he feels very bad that something like this has happened again after such a long period of calm.

"I was shocked when I heard the news."

Concerning the initial investigation, Lt. Gen. Kittti said that the schools that were burned were not in terrorist areas. There have not been any terrorist activities in those areas for a long time. So far, no one knows what the motive for this was.

"But something worth noting is that on 22 July, a report stated that the new Pattani United Liberation Organization [PULO] group held a meeting and expressed dissatisfaction that the old PULO group planned to surrender and become participants in the development of Thailand. Also, the new PULO group is exerting pressure to revive the use of military force. Thus, it's possible that the new PULO group will carry out acts of sabotage instead of terrorism.

Lt. Gen. Kittti said that that was a barbaric act. He has ordered Major General Sitthichai Prathuangthin, the

deputy commander of the 4th Army Region, to go there and gather the facts. But he will act separately from the police. [passage omitted]

4th Army, Police Department on Kelantan Meeting

93SE0254E Bangkok THAI RAT in Thai
2 Aug 93 pp 1, 15, 17

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Lieutenant General Kittti Rattanachaya, the 4th Army Region commander, said that he was shocked by what happened. The reports state that the schools that were burned were located in terrorist areas [as published], but the situation in those areas is normal. In Pattani Province, the terrorists stopped carrying on activities a long time ago. It still isn't clear what the motive for this was. But what is worth noting is that on 22 July, he received a report stating that the new Pattani United Liberation Organization [PULO] group held a meeting. Those at the meeting expressed dissatisfaction that the old PULO group planned to surrender and become Participants in the Development of Thailand. This new group is exerting pressure to revive the use of military force. Thus, they may have committed these acts of sabotage. He said that he has ordered Major General Sitthichai Prathuangsit, the deputy commander of the 4th Army Region, to go there and gather the facts. [passage omitted]

Colonel Phalangkun Klaohan, the Army spokesman, talked about the burning of the schools in Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat Provinces. He said that General Wimon Wongwanit, the Royal Thai Army commander in chief [RTA CINC], has received an initial report from Lt. Gen. Kittti Rattanachaya. The RTA CINC has ordered the 4th Army Region commander to take action on this, because he is very concerned about the lives of the people. The 4th Army Region commander already has the power to make decisions. The 4th Army Region commander has reported that he has sent forces to pursue those who burned the schools in order to find out who was responsible and what their motive for this was. The results should be known by 2 August. Reports will periodically be sent to the RTA CINC on the progress made, because the RTA CINC is very interested in this.

A reporter reported from the Police Department that the police officials concerned with these events are focusing on the PULO group of Hajj Sama-ae Thanam and Hajj Samandato Thanam. This is because it has been learned that on 21 July, they went and met with a group of foreign supporters in Kelantan State, Malaysia. Also, members of this group held a meeting on 31 July, but it isn't known what was discussed at the meeting. Another group is the new PULO group, or PMD [expansion unknown] group. A third group is the Shiite group, which is a separatist group. The fourth group is a local political group. Something worth noting is that a minister wants his older brother to become the head of the Islamic faith in Thailand. PULO and certain religious leaders are very

upset about this. Besides this, he is exerting pressure to change Islamic law. [passage omitted]

Muslim Leader on Efforts To Discredit Politician

93SE0254F Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai
3 Aug 93 pp 1, 2

[Excerpt] Mr. Prasoet Mahamat, the secretary general of the Office of the Head of the Islamic Faith in Thailand, said that it's unlikely that the burning of the schools in the south had anything to do with Islamic law or fact that Mr. Amin Tomina, the older brother of Mr. Den Tomina, the deputy minister of interior, plans to run for the position of head of the Islamic faith in Thailand. And it probably had nothing to do with the the bandit terrorists. On 2 August, the secretary general of the Office of the Head of the Islamic Faith in Thailand said that the schools that were set ablaze were located in urban areas near government buildings. If this really was the work of bandit terrorists, southerners wouldn't be able to stay here, because that would be tantamount to showing that no one is safe. It's more likely that this had something to do with politics. It should be noted that something always seems to happen as we approach the month of October every year, which is the period when the annual expenditure budget is considered. Last year, a bomb was planted at the Hat Yai train station. But the burning of these schools was a very violent act, and it directly affects the masses. This has done psychological damage to the Muslims in the south.

Mr. Prasoet said that the head of the Islamic faith in Thailand has ordered the other secretary general of the Office of the Head of the Islamic Faith in Thailand to go obtain data on this and find out if this had anything to do with the Office of the Head of the Islamic Faith in Thailand. As for providing help, today, Muslims are gathering together under the leadership of the provincial Islamic leaders in order to pray to god for protection and for the arrest of those responsible.

"Because of all the things that have happened in the south, we know that we can't rely on government officials or the police," said Mr. Prasoet.

Mr. Prasoet said that this was not the work of bandit terrorists, because normally, the bandit terrorists mix among the villagers. If they did something like that, the villagers would no longer support them. As for the prime minister's statement that there are still bandit terrorists in the south, Mr. Prasoet said that that is true. But this was not the work of bandit terrorists. This was probably done in order to discredit Mr. Den. Mr. Den is very unhappy about this, because if the perpetrators aren't caught, that will directly affect Mr. Den. But the prime minister should be able to arrest the perpetrators in the near future, because he "has many 'hands and feet' in the south."

The secretary general of the Office of the Head of the Islamic Faith in Thailand said that even though Muslims in the south are dissatisfied with what Mr. Den has done

in revising Islamic law and unhappy about the fact that he is exerting pressure to have his brother become head of the Islamic faith in Thailand, it's unlikely that they would commit an act of violence that leaves children without a place to study. [passage omitted]

MOI, Police, Senior Military Comment

93SE0254G Bangkok NAE0 NA in Thai
3 Aug 93 pp 1, 2

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] In an interview, General Chawalit [Yongchaiyut] said that based on the reports that he has received, all he knows is how many schools were burned down. No one knows what the motive for this was. Some reports have said that Pattani United Liberation Organization [PULO] did this, but he said that he does not believe that.

"I have my own theory based on the existing data, but I can't tell you what it is. We will have to obtain additional data and take a close look at things."

Gen. Chawalit said that it's unlikely that the motive for this was personal or that this had anything to do with revising Islamic law. If this stemmed from one of these two things, the perpetrators probably wouldn't have done anything that violent and they probably would have taken action before now. We must determine whether this was an ordinary criminal act or whether it was an economic or political case.

"In my view, those responsible for this wanted this to have a great effect. Thus, that leads me to believe that they had a political motive. This was an intentional act on the part of some large group. But I can't say who their target was. All we know is that that was a despicable act. We cannot allow such things to happen."

When asked if he thinks that those responsible received support from abroad, the minister of interior said that it wasn't necessary for them to receive support from abroad. This is a rather large organization that doesn't need to hide. [passage omitted]

Major General Sombat Rotphothong, the deputy minister of defense, said that we still can't determine if this was the work of PULO or some other terrorist group, because we don't have clear evidence. But the perpetrators definitely had a reason for doing this. Because the schools were all set on fire at approximately the same time. It's unlike that this stemmed from the fact that the old bandit terrorists are planning to surrender and become Participants in the Development of Thailand, which has made the new bandit terrorist group unhappy. [passage omitted]

"At present, everyone has his own views on who did this. The 4th Army Region commander thinks that it was the new PULO group. We must wait a little while longer until things become clear."

He was asked if this was the fault of the provincial governors. The military had provided information on

sabotage activities in advance, but they allowed that to happen. The minister of interior said that everyone was at fault. Everyone must take responsibility. The intelligence system must definitely be improved. The information that has been received must be followed up on before we will know for sure what happened.

Police General Sawat said that this was a very destructive act. Action must be taken, because that could set a precedent.

"As for who did this, I think that they wanted to do great damage and destroy the nation."

Lieutenant General Kittu Rattanachaya once said that the bandit terrorists no longer have combat capabilities, but then this happened. The 4th Army Region commander said that the bandit terrorists no longer have the capabilities to wage an armed struggle. But they still exist and still have separatist ideas. That idea has existed for a long time and has been implanted in the minds of youths. He once said that they no longer have combat capabilities because he wanted to make a distinction between the work of the military and the police. What happened shows the weaknesses of the state apparatus. He said that he is shocked that something like that could have happened.

"Ever since 22 July, the military constantly provided information to the provinces stating that people were planning to carry out acts of sabotage in these three provinces. But that still happened. No one expected that. The police and the provincial governors know the truth. We will have to wait and see what they report to the minister of interior and where they place the blame. In view of the fact that they were warned in advance and still didn't take action, who are you going to blame?"

The 4th Army Region commander said that the initial investigation done by the military indicates that this was the work of the new bandit terrorist group, which split away to form a new group. The areas where this occurred are not critical areas.

"I would like three days to find out which bandit terrorist group was behind this. I think that should be enough time to find out. And I can assure you that the army's intelligence was good. It's just that those who were provided this information failed to take proper action."

As for the negotiations to have the remaining bandit terrorists surrender and become participants in the development of Thailand, Lt. Gen. Kittu said that the negotiations are continuing. But the project has not yet been approved. [passage omitted]

After being appointed head of the investigation team and visiting the schools that were burned down, Police Lieutenant General Krai Suk Sinsuk, the Police Region 4 commissioner, held an emergency meeting with a number of police inspectors in order to plan the investigation.

In an interview, Police Lt. Gen. Krai Suk said that intelligence officials have learned that this was the work of the Zone 2 National Revolutionary Front (BRN) group, which is composed of younger people who received their training in the Kubung Choe Nong mountains in Si Sakon District, Narathiwat Province, along the border with Malaysia. This group is composed of about 30-40 men. This group has received training in various combat techniques.

"Setting fire to schools was probably part of the curriculum, which they put into practice. An intelligence report states that one team just completed its training in July. Mr. Ariya Tobarasae was the lead instructor. The members of this military unit do not have regular uniforms. When a team completes its training, it will commit an act of sabotage to test what it learned."

A news source from the Commissioner's Office of the Police Region 4 said that PULO or the BRN probably did this in order to express opposition to the attempt by Mr. Den Tomina and other Muslim members of parliament who belong to the New Aspiration Party to revise Islamic law.

The news source said that leaders of these groups held a meeting in Kelantan State, Malaysia, at the beginning of July. But it isn't clear what the purpose of the meeting was. [passage omitted]

A news source from the Special Branch Division said that there are three bandit terrorist groups in the south. One is PULO, which has committed acts of sabotage and set off bombs at various government installations in order to show its power in the hope of attracting aid from abroad. A similar group is the BRN. Both of these groups hold separatist views, but the BRN does not have forces to commit terrorist acts. The third group is the Muslim Shiite group. This group is a religious fundamentalist group and has split away from the other two groups. [passage omitted]

The news source said that after committing a terrorist act, these bandit terrorists flee to Kelantan State in Malaysia, because the head of that state is a member of the opposition and supports Islam. Thus, the bandit terrorists receive better support there than in other states. [passage omitted]

Mr. Wanmuhammad Matha, the deputy speaker of the House and a New Aspiration Party MP [member of parliament] from Yala, said that he does not want to speculate about the reasons for this, but what happened is something new.

"Almost all of the schools that were burned down are outside the zones of influence of the bandit terrorists. But officials still continue to believe that this was the work of bandit terrorists. [passage omitted]"

4th Army Chief Discounts 'Movement' Involvement

93SE0254H Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 4 Aug 93 p 3

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Lieutenant General Kitti Rattanachaya, the 4th Army Region commander, talked about the burning of schools and government buildings in southern border provinces. He said that the military has conducted an investigation, and it has been concluded that this was not the work of a movement. Initially, it was assumed that this was either the work of a movement or that it stemmed from a political conflict. Now that the investigation has shown that a movement was not involved, it's likely that this was a political matter.

"From what I have heard, the attempt to draft an act to manage Islamic activities has generated opposition in the south. Thus, this could have stemmed from a political conflict over this issue. The commissioner of the Police Region 4 has been appointed head of the investigation team. I am sure that those responsible will be caught, because we are not talking about just a couple of people. At least 40-60 people were involved. They will probably be caught in the near future. Military and other officials are taking action. If we can catch one of the men, we should be able to find out who else was involved and what their motive was," said the 4th Army Region commander.

Lt. Gen. Kitti said that the provincial governors have formed a joint civil-police-military command. It should be possible to solve the various problems.

Army Commander Comments

93SE0254I Bangkok THAI RAT in Thai
4 Aug 93 pp 1, 17, 22

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] In an interview, the prime minister simply said that some organization was responsible. This was expanded on by Mr. Thawat Wichaidit, the secretary general to the prime minister, who said that the group that burned down the schools was a highly mobile group. The director-general of the Police Department has reported how many people it took to set fire to the schools and how the fires were set. From the data available, it appears that this was a highly mobile group. Officials are taking too long in arresting those responsible. If they can't catch them, what can be said about the police? This had nothing to do with financial support from abroad or political conflicts between parties. "It was a highly mobile group," said Mr. Thawat. He added that intelligence officials will have to consider the matter. At one of the schools that was set afire, a shadow play was taking place in front of the school. But people managed to set fire to the school without anyone knowing. This can be construed in several ways. This was probably carried out by people in Thailand. Foreigners were not involved. "The prime minister is very concerned about this and is following this closely." [passage omitted]

In his capacity as the director of the Southern Border Administrative Center, Mr. Niphon Bunyaphatro, the deputy under secretary of interior, was interviewed on television Channel 9 on the evening of 3 August concerning the burning of schools in four southern provinces. Reporters asked if a bandit terrorist group was responsible for this. Mr. Niphon said that bandit terrorists did not do this. It was probably a group or movement copying the actions of the bandit terrorists. Because in the past, the bandit terrorists used to set fire to government buildings and schools. Those responsible for this definitely had evil intentions.

As for the objectives of those responsible for this unrest, Mr. Niphon said that he believes that they had some secret motive. Villagers have reacted strongly to this. They know who is responsible. In particular, the Thai Muslims are very unhappy about this. As for whether the schools were burned because of dissatisfaction with the Islamic law, Mr. Niphon said that that still isn't clear. People will have to be patient a while longer. It is the villagers who will tell us who did this and what their motive was.

Concerning the burning of the schools in the south, General Wimon Wongwanit, the Royal Thai Army commander in chief [RTA CINC], said that he has received a report on this, but the details still aren't clear. It isn't clear who did this. But he has asked the mass media to explain to the people that the burning of those schools by terrorists has already done us much harm. That was a terrible act, because it hurts the futures of children. And it slows the development of the locality. The children there are crying because they don't have schools to attend. This destruction has done psychological damage to the people of the entire country. He said that he does not want to see any more splits between government officials. Some teachers have said that they are not being protected. He said that he wants everyone to join together, do their duty as best they can, and help each other.

The RTA CINC said that this was probably carried out by a small number of people in the area. In some places, the buildings were doused in gasoline and set afire. They wanted to earn credit by doing this. Terrorist acts are often committed in August and September. These are committed in order to gain support from abroad. This was done in order to raise the morale of their subordinates, because their subordinates may have split away. They lack confidence in their commanders, and so these people had to formulate a plan and commit the easiest terrorist act possible in order to build up the morale of their men and threaten the Thais living along the border. That is his view on this matter. [passage omitted]

A reporter asked why the intelligence units have not been improved with the budget funds received. A large amount of money has been allotted, but the results have not been very good. Gen. Wimon said that he has already stated that the fire has already destroyed the schools. But we must not let this destroy the solidarity of the units.

There are conflicts among the various groups. A conflict between teachers and government officials will not benefit anyone. We must join our forces in order to protect the property of the nation. The intelligence budget is sufficient. He has allotted money for everything. He said that officials are doing a good job. The mass media doesn't need to know everything.

A reporter said that the military apparently had clues that this was going to happen, but it was not careful. Gen. Wimon admitted that the military had received reports in advance. But they were not clear. As for what the army can do to help in this matter, Gen. Wimon said that all sectors must work together. He said that if just one sector is allowed to handle this, it won't be able to achieve results. The people living in the villages definitely have an inkling of who is responsible. Because those who did this did not come from Washington or New York. It was people in the locality who did this. And it was not people from Bangkok. Thus, the people there probably know who did this. For the sake of our children and young people and for the sake of the country, people with knowledge about this must disclose the facts. Those responsible will definitely be punished. But people should not get into arguments with each other. If people blame each other, we will not be able to accomplish anything.

Gen. Wimon said that he believes that those responsible did this in order to bring credit to themselves, win support from abroad, and bolster the confidence of their subordinates. He has ordered the 4th Army Region commander to take resolution action. As for forming a special action unit to pursue the terrorists, that is up to the 4th Army Region commander, because he is responsible for that area.

Lieutenant General Chettha Thanacharo, the 1st Army Region commander, said that he does not view this as an ordinary matter. There was probably an important reason for doing this. He has just been monitoring the situation and doesn't want anything like that to happen again. The 4th Army Region commander has blamed all sectors, including the interior ministry, for what happened. The minister of interior has said that "I think that a seminar should be held to improve intelligence activities. We cannot allow such things to happen. This presents a terrible picture. There was definitely an intelligence failure. There must be a major intelligence overhaul, because intelligence work is the heart of all operations." [passage omitted]

In Satun Province, a reporter reported that after this occurred, Mr. Mohamad Nasekapan, the secretary of the Coordinating Center for the Shiite Group in the South and an Arabic language instructor at a mosque in Satun Province, stated that it is improper for people to try and implicate certain groups and that this had nothing to do with groups that are involved in certain movements. The Shiite group does not have a policy of committing acts of sabotage. It does not have a separatist policy. People in the government probably know who did this. Shiites

should not be implicated or connected with this. He denied any responsibility for this. [passage omitted]

New Leadership Mooted

93Se0254J Bangkok DAILY NEWS in Thai
7 Aug 93 p 15

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The [leadership] structure of the Bursatu is composed of Mr. Che Mudo, the president, Mr. Micheku Baka, an advisor, and Dr. Arong Muleng, or Arong Amerika, the secretary general. All three live abroad. The Armed Forces of this movement are led by Ariya Tobala, Sama-ae Thanam, Ma Sungai-batu, Ding Bubaesalo, Sainung Nato, and Po Layu. These forces operate in Narathiwat and Yala Provinces. To date, there is no evidence that these forces are active in Pattani Province. [passage omitted]

Military, Police See New Organization

93SE0254K Bangkok BAN MUANG in Thai
8 Aug 93 p 12

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] A news source who traveled with the commissioner of the Police Region 4 in an attempt to solve this case revealed that the movement responsible for burning the schools has its headquarters in Pattani Province. Thus, the investigation is focusing on Pattani Province. If the targets in Pattani can be captured, everything will become clear. The area where there headquarters is supposedly located is the homeland of Mr. Den Tomina, the deputy minister of interior, and the hometown of Mr. Mr. Along Muleng, or Arong Amerika, the man thought to be the secretary general of the Bursatu, or "Unity," group, which is a new Pattani United Liberation Organization [PULO] group. This is based on the evidence obtained by police and military officials. [passage omitted]

4th Army Hypotheses for Arson Attacks

93SE0254L Bangkok BAN MUANG in Thai
9 Aug 93 p 12

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] A reporter reported that in the wake of what happened, a 4th Army Region intelligence unit has come up with seven possible motives for the arson attacks on these schools: 1. This was carried out by certain religious leaders in order to oppose increasing compulsory education to nine years. 2. This was the work of the a new Pattani United Liberation Organization [PULO] group led by Mr. Arong Muleng, or Amerika, which has split away from the group of Mr. Sama-ae Thanam, who wants to establish peace with the 4th Army Region. 3. This stemmed from a conflict between senior government officials in the area and between Mr. Den Tomina and a police general in the Police Region 4. 4. This was instigated by certain people in the locality who failed in their bid to win election to parliament and who rely on their relations with certain bandit terrorist groups. They did this at the request of a national-level political group in order to create a split between the New Aspiration Party and the Democrat

Party. 5. This stemmed from the draft Islamic Activities Act. 6. Those responsible hoped to benefit from the annual reshuffle and budget. 7. A bandit terrorist group did this in the hope of obtaining funds from countries in the Middle East. [passage omitted]

New PULO Movement in South Discussed

93SE0260A Bangkok MATICHON SUT SAPDA
in Thai 6 Aug 93 pp 9, 10

[Excerpts] The past weakness of the bandit terrorists in the south, who had been so weak that they were unable to carry out any acts of violence, led security official to state confidently that they had succeeded in putting out the fire completely and permanently. [passage omitted]

Concerning the recent act of terrorism, it is worth noting that the bandit terrorist group operated in the same way, that is, it used gasoline, incense sticks, coal, hemp gunny bags, and gas lamps used when tapping rubber trees as implements in torching the schools.

Besides this, as their target, they intentionally selected schools in populated zones that security officials considered to be "white" areas, that is areas that are considered to be very safe and that are not heavily guarded. What is important is that this act of terrorism shows that those responsible are highly trained people. They can even be considered to be professionals. This group of professionals did not consist of just four or five people. This terrorist action, which was carried on simultaneously in three provinces, required at least 60 people.

Thus, this bandit terrorist group is not an ordinary group. A terrorist battalion has been formed. The question is, Where did this bandit terrorist group come from? And in view of the recent weakness of the bandit terrorists, where did this group acquire the capability to carry out acts that have shaken the south and the entire country?

Both military and police intelligence units conducted an investigation following this bandit terrorist operation. Both agree that the group responsible for this is a "new Pattani United Liberation Organization [PULO] group" that wants to exert and expand its influence. Three assumptions have been made about this new group:

1. Target of activity: This new PULO group has decided to operate in a new area, that is, operations areas different from those of other PULO groups.
2. This PULO group is composed of young members who are dissatisfied with the older members of PULO, who have surrendered to government officials and become participants in the development of Thailand.
3. The fact that they launched terrorist operations simultaneously probably means that they were trying to draw attention to themselves, which is the nature of newly-formed groups that want to obtain financial support from abroad.

The military and police intelligence units also agree that the members of this new PULO group may have split away from the PULO group of Mr. Sama-ae Thanam or the group of Dr. Arong Muleng, which are PULO groups that are still active today. There are several clues pointing to this.

The leader of this new PULO group is Mr. Aliya Towaeng-aseng. He has trained his men in terrorist operations methods with the close cooperation of a third country. Looking at the formation of this young PULO group, it can be seen that the emphasis is on the word "young." This is because in recruiting new members, they have focused their attention on attracting youths, who are impatient and who are very willing to use violence in carrying on operations in an attempt to revive a terrorist movement that has been weak recently.

Looking at this in greater depth, it can be seen that the attempt to get youths to join this movement resembles the birth of the Pattani Struggle Front, or Mujahadin Pattani, or Barisan Boechat Mujahadin Pattani (BBMP), which was active during the period 1982-1987.

The BBMP was formed at the end of December 1982 by Mr. Wahap Hile, or Ha Yaha, a PULO leader at that time. There was a split within PULO and so this new group was formed. It used the term "mujahadin" (religious war), and its goal was to separate the four southern provinces from Thailand. Its base of terrorist operations was at Ban Chao Samsip in Lochut Subdistrict, Waeng District, Narathiwat Province.

Around January 1987, the BBMP formed two "young force" units, with each unit composed of 12-13 men. They carried on espionage and terrorist activities along the Thai border. They achieved a degree of notoriety, but officials then cracked down on them hard and so they fled to Malaysia. It was probably these "young force" units that provided a model for the formation of this new PULO group.

Police in the Commissioner's Office of the Police Provincial 4 have learned that the new PULO group, trained by Mr. Aliya Towaeng-aseng, has operations bases in Ruso and Si Sakhon districts in Narathiwat Province in the Dunong Chanong mountains along the Thai-Malaysian border. They have had about eight months of training in terrorist operations. The training groups are broken into teams of 20-30 men. So far, at least 60 people have completed the training.

All of those who have completed this training are young people. Mr. Himron Malulin, a member of the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand, said that one group worth watching today is Moslem youths. This group has problems with narcotics. Even though these people have never committed any acts of violence in the past, they are easy to incite. Thus, they are probably being urged to join this violent movement.

Concerning the training carried on in the Dunong Chanong mountains, Police Lieutenant General Krai Suk

Sinsuk, the commissioner of the Police Provincial 4, said that these people are being trained under the close supervision of foreigners. Their objective is different from before. That is, it is not their intent to form a strong armed force. Instead, they are training people to commit acts of terror in order to stir up trouble and cause disorder.

A news source from the Commissioner's Office of the Police Provincial 4 said that the reason why the young PULO group has been able to conceal itself so well is that it has assassinated police informants in various districts in Yala, Narathiwat, and Pattani provinces. In a seven-month period, nine police informants have been killed. Thus, those who remain are afraid to try and obtain information on this group. As a result, there is little intelligence about this, and this is a weakness that has allowed the young PULO bandits to operate effectively, which is clear to everyone today.

Even before the schools were burned down, government officials had managed to patch together a "picture," but it was not clear. Everything was still vague until the group carried out this terrorist act.

A news source in the south said that before these terrorists committed this terrible act of violence, the PULO group of Mr. Sama-ae Thanam was definitely involved in carrying on activities with this young PULO group. On 21 July 1993, a report confirmed that at 1000 hours, members of this group held a meeting in Kelantan State in Malaysia. On 31 July, Mr. Sama-ae Thanam met with 20 members at a house near the Tandu Bungban market in Kelantan State. It is thought that they formulated a plan to carry on operations in Thailand's three border provinces. But because of the lack of sufficient information to predict what might happen, Thai officials can't tell what the objectives of this PULO group were.

Lieutenant General Kitti Rattanachaya, the commander of the 4th Army Region, said that on 22 July 1993, just one day after the meeting held by members of Mr. Sama-ae Thanam's group, he issued a warning to officials in the southern provinces, telling them to be on the alert for acts of sabotage or other acts of violence. But because the intelligence was not clear, proper preparations were not made, and this gave this bandit terrorist group a chance to launch an effective operation against Thais.

Mr. Phalakon Suwannarat, the governor Pattani Province, who was one of the targets affected, said that he had had information on this for a long time and that he had ordered officials to take precautions in the high-risk areas. But the terrorists launched their operation in other areas, that is, their targets were located in white areas, or safe areas. No one thought that the PULO bandits would dare launch attacks in those areas. But we were wrong. It was white areas that were the target of attack this time. Thus, everyone was shocked to hear that in just one night, 33 schools in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat provinces were burned to the ground.

"In view of what happened, it must be admitted that there were intelligence and defense failures," said Mr. Den Tomina, a New Aspiration Party member of parliament [MP] from Pattani Province and the deputy minister of interior, who is well-respected in the Moslem community, in the wake of what happened.

Lt. Gen. Kitti Rattanachaya, the 4th Army Region commander, admitted that both past and recent events stemmed from weaknesses of government units. He admitted that steps must be taken to improve and change things in accord with the situation to protect the lives and property of the people.

Such statements are very different from those made by the 4th Army Region commander several months and several years ago. Then, he was confident that peace and calm had been restored in the south once and for all. However, Lt. Gen. Kitti said that what happened is not at odds with the statements made by the 4th Army Region, which has said that there is no longer any bandit terrorist movement. This is because the army region has said that there are still bandit terrorist groups, but they are not in a position to wage an armed struggle. Today, those groups can send two-three people to carry out an operation. They could burn Hat Yai, who knows? But he did not confirm if this was part of the bandit terrorist movement.

Mr. Bunchuai Thongsri, the president of the Southern Teachers Union, said that the burning of 33 schools in three provinces is the worst act of violence in 40 years. Because of this, 14,000 students don't have schools to attend. The damage is estimated at more than 20 million baht, and this has greatly hurt the morale of the teachers.

This indicates that this bandit terrorist operation has greatly shaken the south. Thus, the officials responsible must quickly take action to solve this problem in an efficient and timely manner. Mr. Den Tomina, the deputy minister of interior, said that schools have been burned before in the south, but the matter has been allowed to die down. But this time, we cannot allow that to happen again. All officials must help in the investigation. If those responsible can't be found, it may be necessary to transfer a large number of officials in these three provinces.

In his capacity as deputy minister of interior, besides having to transfer officials, Mr. Den himself may have to bear responsibility for what happened. Mr. Samphan Thongsamak, the minister of education, said that what happened was like shaking a chair. This was an insult to Mr. Den in his position as a minister and as a Moslem.

Everyone must join together to solve this problem. Putting the blame on someone else won't do any good. This undoubtedly was an affront to Mr. Samphan Thongsamak, too, because this involved property and people directly under his control.

Today, everyone must take a look at their own weaknesses. That is the best solution. Once they have found their

weaknesses, they can take steps to correct them, strengthen themselves, and turn to attacking this evil group.

Regardless of who did this, this is unacceptable to the Thai people, because this was a very terrible act. Those who made it possible for the bandit terrorists to commit this outrage include those officials who failed to manage the "intelligence" efficiently. As a result, PULO bandits have again shaken the morale of southerners.

MILITARY

Army Chief Comments on Chainarong Visa Rejection

93SE0252A Bangkok DAO SLAM in Thai
17 Jul 93 pp 1, 2

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Lieutenant General Chettha Thanacharo, the 1st Army Region Commander, allowed himself to be interviewed by reporters concerning the refusal of Australian officials to issue a travel visa to Lt. Gen. Chainarong Nunphakdi, the Commander of the Institute of Army Academies. He said that it was something which he could not explain. It was Australia's right to do this, but it was not worth going this far. He spoke as one who was being fair, not as one who belonged to the same group. With regard to the events of May 1992, this issue was settled because Thailand had demonstrated its humanity with regard to human rights by being a democracy. This was clear when one looked at the big picture. One should not make large issues out of small issues. This would be taking advantage of those involved in past events.

The reporters asked whether this refusal of a visa concerned the individual involved more than his institution. Lt. Gen. Chettha said that if he traveled in an official capacity he might be in the same position. Since he was a high-level officer, he would encounter problems. He could not say that there were no problems. It was something which could be accommodated. The fact that they [the Australians] had done this had good effects and bad effects. The good effect was that it demonstrated the protection of human rights and that the events of May 1992 were bad with no redeeming features. This was good for them but hurt us.

The reporters asked whether he could correct the situation because of his position. He said that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs might ask them (the Australian government) what their reasons were. They would probably understand because even old problems in history could be discussed again or somehow dealt with. There was not much he could do personally. He felt that we would have to think more broadly about this because they were looking at only one aspect and were undecided while we were asking that it be reconsidered. [Why did they do it then.] If one considered what the damage might be, it would be great. If people did not think about it, there might be little effect. But it would be impossible for there to be no effect. Lieutenant General Chettha said that he

understood that Australia had received some information. He felt that they respected Thai officials in Thailand. He would not complain if there were a black list for people entering the country who might carry opium or smuggled goods, but this would be an insult for Thai officials. With regard to the second item that publicizing this would benefit someone - he did not accept that.

Submarine Procurement Discussed

93SE0237A Bangkok LAK THAI in Thai
19-25 Jun 93 pp 23, 24

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] The mission of the navy is to protect Thailand's broad territorial waters. In particular, this is the main mission of the Operations Fleet, which is the Navy's main combat unit. It has more than 120 warships, 150 boats for river operations, and 50 aircraft. [passage omitted]

It is essential that the Operations Fleet develop its combat forces and modernize its weapons systems. Even though we already have a large Navy, we still don't have warships with sufficient capabilities to defend our territorial waters. Today, the Thai Navy is considered to be the equal of that of any other in the ASEAN countries. We have three regional squadrons, which are responsible for the high seas and the Andaman Sea, the Gulf Patrol Squadron, the 1st and 2d frigate flotillas, a mine flotilla, a helicopter carrier flotilla, a landing craft flotilla, a logistics flotilla, and a river flotilla.

Besides this, we have naval coastal defense units, border patrol units, southern coastal defense units, Andaman coastal defense units, and the Mekong River Operations Unit. In the future, the Navy will have will have a submarine flotilla. In the past, the Navy had submarines. From the time that Admiral Sombun Chuaphibun served as Navy commander-in-chief until the time of Admiral Admiral Wichet Karunyawanit, there has frequently been talk about again procuring submarines. The Navy plans to acquire submarines if the government provides it with the funds.

Some people have questioned the necessity of this. The commander of the Operations Fleet has said that the Navy has formulated a plan on the structure of the Navy, and that plan calls for having a submarine flotilla. A submarine is one weapon that can be used in naval warfare. A single submarine has great capabilities. Our enemies will have to use six destroyers. Submarines can destroy the enemy and defend themselves. The Navy really needs submarines, and it is believed that in the near future, the Thai people will be able to view a medium-sized submarine acquired by the Navy.

During the [Second] World War, the Navy had four submarines. They were given literary names, such as Phlai Chumphon and Matchanaru. But after the Second World War ended, certain things began to deteriorate. If the submarines had submerged, it could have been dangerous. Thus, the ships were abandoned. Our first submarine commander was naval Captain Phan Premmani.

As for the submarine issue, the present commander-in-chief of the Navy, Admiral Wichet Karunyawanit, has stated that the Navy has already formulated a program and that the Ministry of Defense has approved the Navy's plan to acquire submarines. But the government has not been able to provide the funds. He said that the Navy has been studying the submarine issue for more than five years and that it has sent officials to countries that build submarines to obtain data. We now have the data and are just waiting for budget funds.

Is the Chuan government interested in this? A submarine is a very important naval weapon, particularly for countries that border the sea. Submarines can operate both beneath the ocean and on the surface. This is the most effective weapon for attacking other submarines. This is a distinct possibility in the Gulf of Thailand. If enemy submarines launch an attack against cargo vessels in the Gulf of Thailand, as happened in the Second World War, the best way to defend against those submarines is to use submarines against them. Thus, this is very important, and the Thai Government should not ignore this. Don't forget that we have eastern and western seaboard development projects. We have many ocean resources. If submarines from other countries plant mines, ships won't be able to get through. Or if those submarines fire torpedoes or guided missiles at industrial plants, what will we do? If we have submarines on patrol, no one will dare enter our waters.

The government should see the necessity of acquiring submarines. Today, we face many naval threats. The Ministry of Defense has considered this and feels that there is enough money for this program. There is sufficient money to buy several submarines. We don't have to buy four submarines. We can start by buying two to provide defense as discussed above. The government should consider this. The Navy has constantly stated that this is necessary, because submarines are one of the best weapons for defending the country's interests. But they cost a lot. [passage omitted]

October Reshuffle Prospects for Classes 11-14

93SE0252B Bangkok LAK THAI in Thai
24-30 Jul 93 pp 15, 16

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The Royal Thai Army [RTA] officers of the same class were not at the head of the line as they were in the Royal Thai Air Force [RTAF] and Royal Thai Navy [RTN]. There would be no changes in the rank of general, but what was interesting was the "command structure" - would there be a Sangkhaina group somewhere?

General Wimon Wongwanit, the RTA commander in chief, was to retire in October 1995 and needed to build a personal support base. Even though those under his command were his support base by reason of their position, nevertheless in secret he would have to be able to trust them 1000 percent - 50/50 would not work.

In the transfers of September 1992 General Wimon did not gain much support in the command structure. It could be seen that Royal Military Academy Class 11 was still considered the support base of the old guard. General Wimon did not have much effect.

Class 12 was felt to be the only route for General Wimon, especially Lt. General Surayut Chulanon, the commander of the Command Unit for Special Warfare.

It was felt that in October of this year Class 12 would increase in power more than just the position of commander of Ph. or some members in the command structure because this class had advanced beyond this level already. It could only advance to being administrators in the command system.

In the "chain of command" in the past it was clear that Class 11 was overrepresented. If no events such as the savage events of May [1992] occurred, it was felt that 1993 would be a golden year for Class 11. At the very least Lt. General Chainarong Nuphakdi would have to advance to 1st Army Region Commander and become one of the five Generals. He would definitely be in line to become RTA commander in chief replacing General Wirot Saengsanit.

But the events mentioned [of May 1992] had caused the situation in the military to change completely. It was now felt that the careers of some members of Class 11 had been ended. Some members had been able carefully to redeem themselves, but it would be difficult for them to advance as in the past.

Class 13 seemed to have been under some curse and had not been outstanding. Like the demise of Class 11 this had provided an opportunity for Class 12 to get ahead. Strangely Class 13 had been silent.

Beyond Class 12 was Class 14 which had been a bright star. It had overtaken Class 13 which had been unfortunate and had not risen.

Class 14 was strong and hot and like hot steel it had advanced through the command structure. Those who had advanced included Maj. General Somphop Attanan, the Commander of the 1st Division RO [King's Guards]; Maj. General Nippon Pharannit, the commander of the 2nd Infantry Division; Maj. General Sanan Maroengsit, the commander of the 12th Infantry Division; Maj. General Somsak Chaiyasit, the commander of the Special Warfare Center; and Maj. General Prakit Siriphan, the commander of the Air Defense Center.

These were the stars of Class 14 who had advanced and were awaiting their friends. Generally the positions mentioned here were held by general officers who had replaced members of Class 11. This October more were to be advanced in the command structure.

It was felt that this coming October Class 14 would be remarkable.

ECONOMIC

High Rate of Labor Injuries; U.S. Blamed

93SE0257A Bangkok NAEON in Thai
5 Aug 93 pp 1, 2

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] On the afternoon of 4 August at the Bangkok Palace Hotel, a debate was held on the topic "Labor and Health." Those participating in the debate included Dr. Oraphan Methadilokkun, the president of the Occupational and Environmental Health Association of Thailand, Mr. Thawisuk Phanpheng, the director of the Occupational and Environmental Health Division, Ministry of Public Health, and Mr. Chaikut Chawalitnithikun, the director of the Institute for the Study of Work Place Safety, Ministry of Interior.

Dr. Oraphan said that a report issued by the Epidemiology Division, Ministry of Public Health, states that the rate of labor-related illnesses is approximately 2-20,000 people per 100,000 people. The highest number of deaths stems from falls in the construction industry.

Besides this, in Samut Prakan Province, 30 percent of the people have contacted illnesses from smelting ore. Also, 20 percent of the laborers nationwide have become ill from chemicals.

Dr. Oraphan talked about the causes of work-related illnesses. She said that a rather large number of dangerous industrial plants have been built in Thailand. Most of these have been built with American investment capital. The dangerous industries have been built in Thailand, but light industries are usually located in Singapore.

Also, the safety standards in place in Thailand are not in accord with the labor law, and there is a shortage of qualified people to supervise things. Frequently, factories that do not meet the standards are built.

Mr. Chaikut said that more than 6 million workers in the labor sector and 18 million in the agricultural sector lack knowledge and experience, and they have an erroneous viewpoint in working. Thus, they become careless. Every day, four people are injured on the job every four minutes, which is about 23 people an hour. The highest rate of injury and death is among workers at small factories who are not monitored closely by their employers.

Mr. Chaikut said that in building tall buildings, the duties of the workers change frequently. Thus, they lack expertise, and so accidents can happen very easily. Farmers, who form the largest group of workers, are not afforded protection by the government.

Besides this, it has been found that 50 percent of the laborers at textile plants are addicted to inhalants used in industrial work, and 70 percent of the construction workers are alcoholics. [passage omitted]

R&D, Technology Transfer Problems Discussed

93SE0253B Bangkok THAI RAT in Thai 29 Jul 93 p 5

[Excerpts] It is generally agreed that Thailand's "scientific and technical" development is still very "backward." But this is not because Thai scientists lack talent. Instead, the main reason for this is that the public sector has not provided real support. [passage omitted]

At the end of last week, the Damrong Latphiphat Foundation and the National Office for Scientific and Technical Development, held a conference on "The Transfer of Scientific and Technological Advances to Thailand." This was the third such conference. A total of 76 scientists who have worked abroad attended this conference.

The main topic of the conference was divided into various sub-topics such as policies and stratagems for scientific and technological self-reliance in Thailand, the development of technology in the fields of biology, medicine, electricity, and computers, natural resources and the environment, and technology for industry. But one of the most interesting topics was "Joining Together for Research and Development [R&D]: Behind Investment in the Future," which is the heart of scientific and technological development to bring the greatest benefits. Other speakers at the conference included research and development experts from both here and abroad.

The discussion began with a debate on the need to conduct joint studies, concrete examples of joint action, and proposals for projects to form joint research and development groups in Thailand. The conference concluded with speeches by academics and researchers in Thailand on the possibilities for implementing the proposals.

The first researcher to speak was Dr. Methi Wecharatana, who works at the New Jersey State Technology Institute in the United States. He said that in Europe and the United States, research activities have been carried on jointly for more than 20 years. In particular, in the United States the private sector and the Department of Defense often carry on joint research projects.

One example of joint research cited by Dr. Methi is the New Jersey Research Center for the Disposal of Industrial Waste. The U.S. government provided initial funds for buildings and research equipment and provided support for operations for three years. Various industrial companies have put up money to pay the expenses. This is because it is felt that the industrial sector must take responsibility for the waste emitted by the industrial plants.

"Such joint activities will mobilize many researchers from the universities. This center will stipulate standards and recommend controls on industrial plants to the

public sector so that plant inspections are carried out correctly in accord with the actual situation."

Concerning joint research and development activities such as this, Dr. Methi said that the government must be the one to initiate things. But the private sector must be allowed to play a role from the very beginning. Also, the universities must cooperate closely.

Dr. Itthi Rutthaphon, a researcher with the Research Center of the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry, who is an expert in the field of superconductors, talked about joint scientific and technical research and development activities in Japan. He said that emphasis is placed on risky research programs and research that will help reduce reliance on other countries. And the important thing is that in Japan, the results of the various activities are evaluated constantly.

"As an example in carrying on joint activities, various private companies have formed a foundation to conduct research on superconductors. The government provides financial support, and the private companies are responsible for sending researchers to do research work for two-three years. At the conclusion of a project, the researchers return to their old positions, and the equipment is donated to the universities. I think that such a form is suitable for Thailand, because the private sector in Thailand often encounters problems in selecting projects because of the lack of data. Thus, it should be pointed out what needs to be done."

But Dr. Itthi also issued a warning about conducting joint research in Thailand. He said that appropriate research projects must be selected, and the system must be capable of changing in accord with the situation.

The next researcher to speak was Dr. Thakoengdet Duwattanasamrut, who works for the Reliance Electric Company in the state of Georgia, United States, who will recommend a program to be carried out in Thailand.

As for the joint research and development program that Dr. Thakoengdet plans to suggest, he wants this program to be carried on by researchers from a university. This program should concern saving energy. It should be initiated by university professors, with the government providing support from the very beginning. Market needs should be the deciding factor, and people in the private sector should gradually become involved.

"Those who participate in this project must be willing to give first before benefiting from the project. The government must support those projects that will be of real benefit."

After listening to the recommendations by Thai researchers working abroad on ways to carry on joint research and development projects, Dr. Wirot Tantraphon, the managing director of the Premier Company, who is responsible for the research and development activities of the company, talked about the feasibility of the various proposals.

"I am happy that people are eager to help develop our country. But I am very concerned about how prepared Thailand is, especially now. For example, there are problems concerning personnel, equipment, and funds. In the past, our rate of increase in funding for research and development activities was lower than that of South Korea, Malaysia, and Taiwan. And what is important is that people at the policy level who are in a position to make decisions on authorizing budget funds have never attended a conference such as this. Thus, they tend to provide verbal support more than actual support."

Dr. Wirot said that any joint activity implemented must be in accord with the actual situation in Thailand. Also, state units should help the private sector build research centers at the universities in order to promote industry. It will be difficult to get people in the private sector to invest immediately, because they have never done this before. And a characteristic of the Thai private sector is that it won't wait for results far in the future.

The final person to speak on the possibility of carrying on joint scientific and technological research and development activities between the government, the private sector, and the universities was Dr. Phairat Tatyaphong, the rector of the Lat Krabang campus of the King Mongkut's Institute of Technology and the director of the National Computer Technology Research Center.

"I think that everyone here agrees with the proposals of the experts from abroad. But the question is, How can we get the politicians responsible for allotting budget funds to listen? We must make an effort to get them to listen."

Even so, the computer research center headed by Dr. Phairat has made an effort to foster cooperation between the private sector and the universities. About 60 projects have already been completed with budget funds of only about 70 million baht a year. However, these are small-scale projects that have focused mainly on developing existing products. [passage omitted]

Paper 'Warns' Government on Khmer Rouge

93SE0251B Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 5 Aug 93 p 4

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] There was an incident at the end of last week which caused the United Nations to accuse Thailand of secretly supporting the Khmer Rouge. The United Nations claimed that a number of UN soldiers were held by the Khmer Rouge in Thai territory for 12 hours. This incident aroused suspicions that Thailand was aiding the Khmer Rouge and also aroused suspicions with regard to [Thai compliance with] the UN ban on commerce with the Khmer Rouge.

Even though the United Nations is to withdraw from Cambodia and the Thai government will deny that UN soldiers were detained by the Khmer Rouge on Thai territory for half a day or more, nevertheless we feel that this news is not auspicious for Thailand. In addition the

more the United Nations withdraws from Cambodia, the more this will bring censure on Thailand of various kinds.

We would like to warn the government to be careful in this matter especially with respect to guarding the Thai border area. Not only are there many bandits along the border but fighting spills over onto Thai territory. We feel that the benefits derived from this conflict are not worth the [problems caused].

Senior Police Official on IPR Enforcement

93SE0257B Bangkok THAI RAT in Thai 22 Jul 93 p 5

[Text] In the past, foreigners viewed Thailand as one of the countries guilty of violating the intellectual property rights [IPR] of others, particularly rights to musical tapes, video tapes, and compact disks. Because of this, the owners of the intellectual property, particularly in the United States, put pressure on their governments to find a way to force Thailand to take resolute action on this problem. As a result of this, the violation of property rights in Thailand became an international issue, with Thailand constantly being criticized.

Finally, the Thai Government issued a clear policy, ordering all government officials concerned to crack down on the violation of intellectual property rights as demanded by the great powers that own this intellectual property. We now have an Office of the Prime Minister regulation on enforcing the laws on suppressing property rights infringements, which shows who in Thailand will be affected by infringements on such rights.

The details of this regulation were explained in detail by Police Colonel Wanlop Watchanaphukka, the deputy commander of the Economic Affairs Investigation Division.

"The term 'intellectual property' encompasses the Copyright Act, the Trademark Act, and the Patent Act. But the act that is violated most frequently is the Copyright Act. This is because copyrights do not have to be registered. All that is necessary is to disseminate information and you know who the owner of the copyright is.

"The most common way to violate a copyright is to copy and modify the property. For example, a musical tape is duplicated and then sold or distributed in large numbers. Duplication refers to all forms of plagiarizing, including imitating, making copies, making a mold, and recording sounds, images, or sounds and images from the original, a copy, or from an advertisement. This includes copying all the material or only parts. All of this is considered 'duplication.'

"As for 'modification,' an example is taking a song composed by someone else and changing the words. This includes taking a Chinese or Western song and changing the words to Thai. This also includes taking a Thai song and simply changing the words. If these works are copyrighted, even if only certain sections are modified,

that does not give people the right to do this unless the purpose is for study and research or for personal family use in accord with Article 30. Only in such cases will this not be considered to be a violation of the Copyright Act.

"Looking at the problem of copyright violations in Thailand, it can be seen that most of the motion pictures or videos that are duplicated come from the United States. But most of the songs that are duplicated, whether tape cassettes or compact disks, are European songs that are very popular in the United States.

"Some people may wonder why Thailand has begun suppressing this just recently. The answer is that several decades ago, various countries held a conference and signed a convention in the city of Berne. They agreed that the member countries would protect each other's copyrights. Thailand was one of those countries. For example, we will protect the copyrights of England, Japan, and Canada, and those countries will protect our copyrights.

"In 1989 the United States decided to become a member of the Berne Convention, because it saw that it had nine of the largest motion picture companies in the world. It also has some famous singers, but not many. After the United States came under the protection of this convention, Thailand had to change its methods. That is, in the past we did not afford protection to their works, but now we have to provide protection in accord with this convention. In addition, we are being pressured by U.S. commercial law, that is, Article 301. The quotas for goods exported by Thailand might be lowered, and tariffs might be raised. Thus, we have had to take resolute action since 1991.

"In the end, the Ministry of Commerce proposed issuing this Office of the Prime Minister regulation on 16 April 1993 to set guidelines for everyone concerned. This regulation covers the production, distribution, and possession for purposes of distribution of musical tapes, video tapes, and compact disks. This regulation stipulates that these items are protected property based on the Consumer Protection Act. The production, distribution, or possession for distribution of musical tapes, video tapes, and compact disks are activities that require a permit from the registration officer in accord with Article 6 of the Tape and Television Materials Protection Act.

"Besides this, this regulation stipulates that the government units responsible for suppressing copyright violations are to clearly divide the work. The units concerned are the Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Commerce. The Intellectual Property Department, Ministry of Commerce, is the center for coordinating things with the public and private sectors concerned, formulating operating regulations, and preparing manuals in order to carry on things in accord with this regulation. Besides this, the results of the activities are to be publicized both here and abroad in order to foster trade discipline among businessmen in

this field and build good relations with the countries that own the copyrights. A report on the results achieved is to be submitted to the prime minister on the 5th of every month.

"As for actual operations, the Intellectual Property Department is responsible for promulgating laws, registering items, and handling requests for business permits. As for the police, all police officials are responsible for suppressing those who violate the law. The Police Department has entrusted the Economic Affairs Investigation Division, Central Investigation Bureau, with the task of serving as the center in compiling data, formulating suppression plans, and gathering statistics from all localities in the country where violations have been discovered after the person who has been damaged has filed a complaint. In particular, if the loss exceeds 5 million baht, if a large gang is involved, or if this is a complex issue affecting several places, the Economic Affairs Investigation Division will be directly responsible for handling the matter.

"Today, we have both laws and operating regulations to enable the officials concerned to take swift action in accord with their duties. In the past, Thai police officials were criticized for being lax in suppressing the major violators of copyrights. For example, when someone filed a charge with the police, the police often considered that to be a minor matter and did not investigate or make an arrest. But we can no longer act like that, because there are now many laws and regulations that we must enforce. Thus, I would like to ask those who are now violating copyrights to understand that we have to act in accord with the existing laws even if that sometimes upsets consumers.

"However, copyright cases are cases that can be litigated. Thus, before we can investigate a case, the person damaged must first file charges and turn the matter over to the investigation section. If the person damaged, that is, the person who holds the copyright, or his representative does not file charges and try to protect his copyright, the police can't do anything to help him. This is something that needs to be understood."

Thus, the question is, In view of the fact that we have taken such resolute action to suppress both narcotics traffickers and those who violate property rights, how will our superpower allies such as the United States respond to Thailand's show of friendship?

Sources on Changes in Finance, Securities Laws

93SE0253A Bangkok LAK THAI in Thai
24-30 Jul 93 pp 23, 24

[Text] In the past, even though finance and securities were separate business activities, there was a close connection between these two types of activities. And because the securities business began playing an equivalent role after the founding of the Securities Exchange of Thailand, it was able to compete and survive on its own. Thus, the government organizations concerned,

that is, the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Thailand, gave people a chance to carry on finance and securities activities jointly.

"But looking at the views of officials, it can be seen that they always intended for these two activities to remain separate. Thus, in issuing business permits, it was always very clear which was a finance permit and which was a securities permit. There were four permits for each activity. But because that was not the right time for those activities to stand on their own, people were allowed to combine these activities under the name "finance and securities." There were eight permits, four for finance activities and four for securities activities. Thus, a finance and securities business was issued all eight permits and could carry on both types of activities," said a news source to LAK THAI.

The news source said that at that time, there were very few securities businesses that operated alone, but there were a large number of finance businesses that did so. But most such businesses carried on both finance and securities activities. However, after the securities market was developed, it began to play a much clearer role. Thus, the national bank and the Ministry of Finance began thinking about separating the finance business from the securities business. The first attempt to do this was in 1988 during the time that Mr. Pramuan Saphawasu was the minister of finance. That was the golden age of the Thai economy and the securities market. The situation at that time was very favorable for separating these two types of activities. But the attempt failed, because the political factors changed. The national bank, however, did not give up on this idea.

An attempt was made to "push" this idea. The finance and securities business continued to grow, and Thailand's securities market grew stronger and stronger. Thus, they probably could have been separated without any concern for the fact that the securities business had its ups and downs, with the result that some people thought that it had to rely on the finance business, which was stronger. During the golden age of the stock market, the revenues of the securities business were much higher than those of the finance business. Also, the securities business was so attractive that the price of a broker's seat on the Securities Exchange of Thailand soared to 4-500 million baht. Officials were confident that the securities business definitely had a future; otherwise, people in the private sector would not pay such a high price for a seat. Thus, there was even greater pressure to separate these two businesses.

The news source said that when the Securities Market Act and the Act to Establish the Securities and Exchange Commission were promulgated, which clearly separated responsibility for supervising the securities business, an attempt was made to include the issue of separating the finance business from the securities business. That provided an opportunity for separating these activities over a period of time. And as an inducement, finance businesses were permitted to own all of the shares in the

securities companies. But that did not achieve very much, because there were many conflicting views and there were many who opposed this for various reasons. In particular, there was a lack of personnel, and the stock market was depressed because of the changing situation. Thus, businessmen were not sure if they would be able to survive if these business activities were separated.

"There was the recent stock market crisis from churning shares, which officials think stemmed from the fact that finance and securities activities are carried on by the same company. People were extended huge amounts in credit, or margin as it is called, totaling 5-20 billion baht. The national bank thought that that was very dangerous, and so it took action to separate finance and securities activities as quickly as possible. Because today, the supervisory body, that is, the Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC], is already separate from the national bank."

Thus, recently the Ministry of Finance issued a regulation permitting the various financial institutions, including the commercial banks, finance companies, and even the credit foncier companies, to apply for permits to engage in securities activities. This must involve the selling of securities based on the recommendations of the SEC. The reason given for this is that we need to have a secondary debt instrument market. However, it must be admitted that by doing this, investment officials will be giving more to investors. The conditions imposed on those who request a permit are: They must have net capital of at least 500 million baht, they must have net assets of at least 5 billion baht, and they must have earned a net profit for at least five consecutive years prior to requesting the permit. Clearly, this will open the door to granting more permits in order to strengthen the securities business. Thus, if things go according to plan, it should not be too long before securities activities are separated from finance activities.

POLITICAL

Article Comments on Renovation, Socialism

932E0067A Hanoi TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN
DAN in Vietnamese May 93 pp 23, 27

[Article by Nguyen Dang Quang, member of the Department of Ideology and Culture of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee: "Is It True That Renovation Is Causing the Loss of Socialism?"]

[Text] The cause of renovation in our country has recorded many achievements. Although these achievements are only initial ones, they have opened up bright prospects. This is something everyone can see, including international opinion. The targets attained in 1992 have further confirmed this appraisal.

However, very fundamental questions are being raised in society. Is this renovation socialist-oriented? Will market economy lead our country onto the capitalist road? How can the market be oriented in accordance with the socialist objective?

Even in foreign countries there have been remarks that Vietnam is abandoning its socialist objective and switching to the capitalist road step by step.

In the past, after collapsing as a result of the grave mistakes they made in carrying out restructuring and reforms, the socialist countries in east Europe had switched to the capitalist road. Meanwhile, the United States has vowed to do everything—from isolating and encircling to giving aid and promoting cooperation—to incorporate the four remainder socialist countries, including Vietnam, into capitalism. This is also a fact that anyone responsible for the nation's destiny must ponder over.

The above-mentioned questions are very fundamental and the answers already provided seem unconvincing. Much still has to be discussed in both theory and practice to elucidate these questions. The various resolutions of the party have laid the very important initial theoretical foundations; however, we still have to continue to substantiate the renovative line, "gradually defining more clearly the path and approaches to socialism in our country" (Resolution of the Third Plenum of the Party Central Committee). To fulfill this task, our party and state are carrying out 10 state-level research programs on social sciences and reviewing the practice of renovation in Vietnam.

However, it is certainly useful for us to continue discussing these questions, and for every one of us to contribute an additional point of view. This article is meant to contribute some reflections on this matter.

Some comrades have relied on the old perceptions and old models of socialism to examine the current renovation undertaking. This has resulted in their contention

that renovation has negated the gains of socialist construction over the past few decades. For example, in many places, agricultural cooperatives now only exist in form; some aspects of educational, public health, cultural, and social services have clearly gone downhill; the nonstate economic sectors have developed very rapidly; differentiation between the rich and the poor is replacing the past egalitarian system of state subsidies, and so forth.

So, how should these changes be dissected?

Have the various policies of renovation in agriculture adopted since the advent of Directive 100 to date conformed to the wishes of peasants and prompted agricultural production to develop faster than previously? Many years ago, when agricultural cooperativization was under way, cooperative members worked as summoned by the clang of a makeshift gong, and the land and other property of the cooperatives gradually became ownerless. The peasants were not attached to their land and resignedly accepted ascetic egalitarianism. Historical realities have shown that the peasants' confidence in the party and socialism stemmed first of all from the fact that our party had given them land, a basic need that no other parties or classes had been able to satisfy. However, in the process of implementation, there had been mistakes as mentioned above. Since the new policies were implemented, peasants have really become the owners of their land and have been free to engage in business to enrich themselves with their own energy and talents. Everybody acknowledges that it is due to renovation (and not to any favors bestowed by the party and government) that the peasant has been liberated in production. Agriculture has made tangible progress, and Vietnam has become the world's third largest rice exporter. Is it possible that this "achievement" is nonsocialist?

As for the old-style cooperatives, the fact that they are gradually losing their role does not mean that we have made light of the collective economy. Renovation will pave the way for the appearance of a more suitable and efficient model of collective economy in agricultural production. The independent economic units that are the peasant households will give rise to various forms of voluntary, diversified economic cooperation of many different standards. The laws of commodity-based economy and market-oriented economy are and will be guiding peasants in associating and cooperating with each other and with the state. This is a steady path to shaping diverse forms of collective ownership and all-people ownership in the agricultural production sector. Thus, we are advancing the countryside and peasants to socialism according to the new perceptions and by means of new approaches and measures that are more popular and more consistent with the laws of development. Despite the many remainder difficulties and entanglements, this new direction of the countryside, peasants, and agriculture is obviously "better" and more effectual than the one prevailing at the time when entire

villages or even several villages were collectivized at the same time. Is it possible that such a new direction is nonsocialist?

Concerning the existence of several systems of ownership and several economic sectors, in the past we believed that in a socialist society there should be only one system of ownership characteristic of socialism, that is the system of public ownership in the two forms of state ownership and collective ownership. Because of this notion, there had been times when we had urgently carried out transformation in order to quickly abolish all nonstate, noncooperative economic sectors. Reality has shown that that way of doing things was wrong as it was incapable of bringing into full play the efforts of all social forces and releasing all latent productive potential in society as a whole. Over the past few years, the renovation policy has produced tangible results: production has developed, goods have been plentiful, services have become convenient, the living standards of the people of many strata have been improved (thanks to the fact that they have been allowed to engage in business outside the cooperatives and the nonstate sector), and more jobs have been created for society. But the highest measure of success is that the new policy has been welcomed and implemented by the people. From this reality and through our reference to the world's theories, nowadays we have gained a better understanding of the economic structure and composition of a regime.

First, under all social systems known in history and in all nations, the economy is composed of *several sectors* and built on several different systems of ownership. This conforms to the development of productive forces.

Second, in the general composition of the various economic sectors, each social system has a particular economic sector serving as its foundations. This is not a result of subjective wishes. The standard of productive forces and requirements of social progress will decide which economic sector will play the role of the *foundations* of the national economy.

Conscious of this issue, which has the character of a law, the party and state have attached importance to building the state economic sector so that it may advance step by step to assume the leading role by taking control of key domains and branches, important businesses, and those activities that are necessary for the national economy and the people's welfare but cannot be undertaken by other economic sectors. Concerning those enterprises operating at a loss, the party and state have switched them to other forms of ownership, or have dissolved them. They have also corporatized a number of enterprises functioning efficiently, have reorganized unions of enterprises and corporations to suit them to the market mechanism.... Thus, we are establishing production relations from a lower to a higher level and diversifying the forms of ownership, that is, we are complying with the laws of development and not espousing capitalism.

The 1991 political program affirmed: "In conformity to the development of productive forces, we shall establish socialist production relations step by step from a lower to a higher level, along with the diversification of the forms of ownership.... The state and collective economic sectors will increasingly become the foundations of the national economy."

Efficiency is one of the principal indications of the fundamental role played by the state and collective economic sectors. At present, this is the issue that is provoking the most thinking over these economic sectors. We are experimenting with several forms of business and management organizations in order to renovate the state and collective economic sectors and to gradually raise their efficiency in the market-oriented economy.

Thus, while resolutely switching to market economy and developing several economic sectors, including the private and state capitalist economic sectors, we have also clearly determined which sector must become the fundamental one and which must become the leading one in the national economy. Naturally, there still are many complicated problems both in theory and in reality when this policy is put into effect. The current deficiencies, weaknesses, and decline of the state and collective economic sectors are causing concern and worries to society; they are also a problem that our party and state are trying to resolve.

The educational, public health, and cultural systems along with the system of social security and welfare are always a criterion of social progress and reflect the superiority of the socialist regime. In this matter, there are indeed problems that are causing legitimate concern to all society about the decline of some aspects in the fields of activity mentioned above. But there is no basis for inferring from this that "socialism has been lost."

First, the responsible branches in charge of these fields of activity have been *slow in renovating* themselves after the economic mechanism has been radically renovated. In the process of leading the renovation undertaking in general and economic renovation in particular, party committees and the administration at all levels have made light of the task of leading and managing these domains. While their budget-based investment has remained limited, they have shown laxity and right-wing deviationism in management and have adopted a simplistic notion concerning the abolition of subsidies in these fields of activity.

Second, the line of renovation, especially economic renovation, is opening up a favorable environment for education, public health, culture, and social welfare to develop faster and better than they did in the former environment of subsidies and bureaucracy. In these domains there has been fresh progress and improvement that we should take note of. The prospects are heartening, and we should not be too pessimistic.

Third, we still have little experience in bringing into full play the positive effects and preventing and countering the negative impact of the market mechanism in education, public health, culture, and social welfare. Therefore, we have shown confusion in coping with the new phenomena and laws prompted by the market mechanism in these domains of activity.

Fourth, the socioeconomic crisis in our country and the crisis of world socialism have deeply affected all areas of human life. We can also mention, to a certain extent, the crisis of faith, the moral crisis, the literary and artistic crisis, the crisis of values, and so forth. We have done much to limit and gradually reduce the extent of these crises and have worked out plans to improve these areas. The Resolution of the Fourth Plenum of the Party Central Committee is a manifestation of our new perception and resolve.

Since renovation was initiated, phenomena that were previously nonexistent have appeared in our society, such as competition, enterprise bankruptcy, inflation, unemployment, and differentiation between the rich and the poor. Should we regard these phenomena as proof of the abandonment of socialism and the shift to capitalism? Should we judge them only by their negative and deadlocked aspects?

These phenomena are closely linked with market economy, but market economy is not to be identified with capitalism. In the past, we had the wrong notion that commodity production and market economy are essentially characteristic of capitalism, therefore the above-mentioned phenomena can exist only under capitalism and are ugly manifestations of the capitalist mode of production, which socialist should and can eliminate. Today, we should change this belief. Commodity production and market economy are a method of socioeconomic organization that has existed for a long time before the appearance of the capitalist mode of production. But capitalism has sprung from commodity production and has lifted market economy to a high level of development. Commodity production and market economy are a basis for the existence and development of capitalism. Commodity production, market economy, the law of value, the law of supply and demand, corporatization... do not have a class content, they are merely tools used for liberating productive power. This is a historical fact that everyone can rely on as a basis for reflecting on the renovation undertaking in our country.

Once the positive effects of the market mechanism are recognized and put to use, the above-mentioned phenomena are inevitable. It is our duty to learn how to deal with them most wisely and rationally. After a few years of renovation we have achieved initial success in dealing with inflation and unemployment, in eliminating hunger, in alleviating poverty, and so forth.

Can we control, effectively deal with, and limit the negative consequences of the above-mentioned phenomena?

The nature of our regime—a regime of the people, by the people, and for the people—will enable us to find ways to resolve these knotty problems. At the beginning, we should modestly learn from the ways of those countries that are highly experienced in this domain, but we should not copy their ways slavishly. Little by little we will be able to find legal systems, procedures, policies, and measures to deal with inflation, competition, bankruptcy, unemployment, and differentiation between the rich and the poor that conform with the situation, traditions, and morality of our nation, and that, at the same time, embody ever more clearly the strategic thought: "Economic growth must be closely linked with social progress and justice, cultural development, and environmental protection." And this is precisely the goal of the socialism that we are building.

The aforementioned phenomena should be examined in accordance with a new way of thinking. The unemployment phenomenon is caused by many things, and we should not hastily blame it on the regime. Generally speaking, any country that applies new technologies and reorganizes its production lines would end up having surplus labor. At the Minh Khai Textile Factory, the import of modern dyeing machines alone has led to the reduction of the number of workers from 550 to 100. At the Hanoi Bus Corporation, reorganization of the urban and suburban passenger transportation networks has immediately resulted in 300 workers losing their jobs. Unemployment cannot be avoided by maintaining backward technologies and irrational methods of business organization. We should accept temporary unemployment and devise measures and policies to create new jobs for the jobless; at the same time, we should apply appropriate social security policies. The most basic thing to do is to create proper environments and conditions for all people to generate jobs for themselves and to provide work for others by applying all lawful and legitimate methods of doing business. We are proceeding in this direction and have obtained heartening results. Thanks to their "unemployment" after being removed from the state payroll, not a few people have had the opportunity to find new jobs and earn income several times higher than their former wages. We should not judge the differentiation between the rich and the poor according to the concept of egalitarian distribution of wealth and the tendency to rely on society-provided subsidies. Competition, selection, and bankruptcy taking place under salutary, legal conditions are in fact a moving force compelling all people to exert themselves. Socialism cannot claim superiority if it lacks a strong moving force. Granting subsidies and favors may breed dependence and nullify moving forces, thereby deforming socialism.

If the new economic mechanism pushes back laziness and gradually dispels dependence and reliance, how can we say that socialism has been lost? If the new mechanism enables all people to stand on their own feet, to think with their own heads, and to use their creative hands to enrich themselves and society, then this is a positive manifestation of the socialism that we are building.

MILITARY

Ha Tay Gains Strength To Build Defense, Security

932E0074A Hanoi TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN DAN in Vietnamese Jun 93 pp 9-13

[Article by Nguyen Dinh So, member of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee, secretary of Ha Tay Provincial Party Committee: "Ha Tay Brings Into Play the Strength of Army-People Unity, Contributes To Building the National Defense-Security Disposition To Defend the Fatherland"]

[Text] Today, after decades of fighting relentlessly to liberate and protect the homeland, and after more than six years of carrying out the renovation undertaking to build and defend the fatherland, although there still are numerous difficulties, our people throughout the country as well as in Ha Tay Province have really become the masters of their country and birthplaces, and are stabilizing and developing the economy and the people's living standards step by step in order to make the people rich and the country powerful and to maintain political stability. At the same time, they stand ready to smash all enemy schemes and tricks of "peaceful evolution" to protect the party, the regime, and the socialist Vietnamese fatherland.

Imbued with patriotism, our people uphold their steadfast and indomitable will, which finds direct expression in our heroic Armed Forces, the outstanding sons and daughters of the people, the trustworthy force of our party and state. Our Armed Forces have sacrificed everything for the fatherland and the people, who have wholeheartedly trusted, loved, and protected them as they would their own children. The "Army and people are of the same will" sentiment, which was and will be forever engraved on the hearts and minds of all Vietnamese citizens, has become a precious national tradition. This is the source of strength and the strongest combat disposition of our Army, and also is the pride of our people.

Throughout the years of the war of resistance for national liberation and defense, the people of Ha Tay selected and sent hundreds of thousands of their sons and daughters to fight in all theaters of operations. Many comrades recorded outstanding achievements and became Heroes of the Armed Forces. Scores of comrades have become generals in the past Vietnam Liberation Army Propaganda Unit and the present Vietnam People's Army.

Right in their birthplace, the people of Ha Tay have set aside a significant amount of land to serve the cause of national defense (to build firing ranges, training grounds, schools, barracks, warehouses...). Residents of a number of villages have voluntarily moved their homes and burial grounds and have come to live in other villages so that the Army could use their land in carrying out their duties. Although there still are numerous difficulties in

their lives, everybody clearly realizes the sacred interests of the fatherland and put them above all.

After the war of resistance was won and the country reunified, there were about 30,000 war dead and tens of thousands of war invalids in Ha Tay. However, imbued with the tradition that "those who drink the water should remember its source," the people of Ha Tay have welcomed 100 percent of their war invalids back into their families for nursing and have allocated fertile land to the families of war dead and war invalids on a priority basis. In 1992 in particular, on the occasion of the 45th Day of War Invalids and Fallen Heroes, the people throughout the province voluntarily contributed more than 8 billion dong to repairing war dead cemeteries, building houses for and presenting savings bankbooks to families of war dead and war invalids. The people consider this a matter of conscience and their responsibility to the Army in the past, at present, and forever in the future.

Although their lives are still hard, the people in the entire province have voluntarily contributed three to four kilograms of grain or one day of work annually to building national defense patron's funds. They would not let the Contract System 10 [contract system applied in agricultural production in accordance with Resolution No. 10 of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee], the market mechanism, the abolition of state subsidies to drive them to make light of the task of building the all-people national defense system.

Thanks to the spirit of "the Army and people being of the same will," the Army units stationed in Ha Tay have always enjoyed the attention, care, and assistance of the party committee echelons, the administration at various levels, and the people in the province.

In their propaganda and educational work, many localities have attached importance to enabling the people to clearly understand their responsibility for building and protecting the Army; for actively motivating their children to be prepared to join up and to serve in the Army with peace of mind; and at the same time, for participating in educating and training the soldiers stationed in their localities so that they can achieve the goal of proving themselves worthy of being called "Uncle Ho's soldiers."

The people have upheld their sense of responsibility for ensuring the safety of Army units, warehouses, and national defense projects. They have helped Army units quickly resolve all hitches and incidents affecting Army-people unity or recover Army units' lost property.

In the process of fighting and building, when barracks were not yet available and soldiers had to evacuate their bases and stay in people's homes, they were wholeheartedly protected and aided by the people, who gave them houses, furniture, and household implements, with almost nothing spared. Nowadays, the Army has built barracks and troops are stationed in stable positions in order to build strong units and to advance toward

regularization and modernization. In the new situation, Army units still preserve "Army-people unity" and remain closely attached to the people by means of practical measures and deeds such as promoting brotherhood with localities where they are stationed, combining field training and mass agitation work, and so forth.

Recently, brotherhood between Army units and localities was strongly promoted, especially between youth union organizations. Well-organized brotherhood promotion has contributed to educating youths and teenagers and consolidating various mass organizations at the grass roots and in localities as well as in Army units. However, the current situation requires that there should be in-depth promotion of brotherhood. Soldiers should participate in the building of villages and subwards that are stable and strong in all respects, and in the building of local defense and security disposition, thereby contributing to creating proper conditions for achieving the objectives of rich people, powerful country, and civilized society in every locality. This is a question of strategic significance, therefore, we should create a revolutionary movement of the masses to translate the political consciousness of the people and Army into the masses' revolutionary actions, and to combine the political tasks of the localities in each period of time and the political tasks of Army units so that both sides can act upon and help each other in their efforts to fulfill their tasks.

The Army units stationed in Ba Vi, Son Tay, Hoai Duc, Chuong Mi... have established brotherhood with one, two or more establishments. Aside from promoting brotherhood among youths, many units have also established brotherhood with other mass organizations such as the Vietnam Women's Union, the Peasants Association, the War Veterans Association, the Red Cross Society....

Combining field training and mass agitation work is a good work method suitable for the current conditions; for this reason, it has been welcomed and supported by the people in localities. Field trips, which enable soldiers to live among and make contact with the people, have directly consolidated Army-people relationship. At the same time, through such contact, soldiers are controlled, assisted, and educated by the people, who create proper conditions for soldiers to forge their popular nature and character and to develop their political trait as "Uncle Ho's soldiers."

If Ha Tay, where soldiers are stationed in many installations, organizes the above-mentioned activities well, it will make a significant contribution to building the local political bases.

In reality, recently many units did a good job of carrying out propaganda and education in current and political affairs and participating in afforestation and water conservancy work. When natural calamities, such as storms and floods, struck, soldiers worked day and night, braving hardships, to protect dams and dikes. When the

harvests were poor, many Army units ate less to save food to help tide poor people over. Various military hospitals have actively examined and treated the local people. For example, Army Hospitals 103, 105...examine and treat tens of thousands of people each year. Army Hospital 103 has agreed to provide medical care for all provincial and district leading cadres and to treat ordinary people for serious diseases, especially burns. At the same time, the hospital has trained 39 village doctors for Phu Xuyen District. Army Hospital 105 has closely coordinated with the local civilian public health service, has agreed to provide health care for more than 1,000 retired cadres and those families covered by welfare policies, has rehabilitated 30 children afflicted with polio.... These are vivid, diverse manifestations of the Army-people unity.

We are carrying out the renovation undertaking initiated and led by our party, and have recorded important initial results. But the enemy still has many very insidious schemes and tricks to oppose and sabotage our regime and to drive a wedge between the party and the people as well as between the Army and the people. Therefore, the task of improving the quality of "Army-people unity" has become all the more important; this is indispensable for improving the overall quality and fighting strength of our Army.

Hundreds of Army units are being stationed in Ha Tay. This particular fact has set for Ha Tay the following tasks in connection with the "Army-people unity": It must continue to bring into play the tradition of the "fish-water relationship between the Army and the people" and build units that are stable and strong in all respects; build and consolidate the all-people national defense system to make it stable and strong; and build stable provincial and district defense zones ready to frustrate all enemy schemes and tricks. Development of the "Army-people unity" is also aimed at promoting the building of localities that are politically stable and strong, economically prosperous, and culturally and socially developed, thereby contributing to strongly pushing forward the cause of renovation in all fields.

With the practical experiences it has undergone in the past years, and for the purpose of meeting the new requirements of its tasks, in the days ahead Ha Tay should develop "Army-people unity" in depth by means of the following practical activities.

First of all, the local party committee echelons and administration should:

—Hold periodic meetings and duty hand-over meetings to communicate to the local military organs the economic, political, and social policies and tasks for each period, and the provincial party committee's guidelines for the mass organizations' activities. This is to enable soldiers to join the localities in building these localities into stable and strong establishments, a task to be closely

linked with the building of Army units that are stable and strong in all respects and capable of satisfactorily fulfilling all tasks.

—Strengthen relations with various Army units and hold discussions with them to work out unified plans for joint actions to maintain political security and social order and safety in their localities, first of all to ensure the safety of warehouses, national defense projects, and Army units. If a complex situation arises, they should uphold their sense of collective responsibility and work together to devise an optimal plan to resolve the problem, instead of trying to pass the buck, showing laxity, or acting irresponsibly.

—Work together with various units and responsible sectors to resolve essential issues, such as paying wages and supplying cash to soldiers in timely fashion. Make suggestions and assist in implementing measures to produce more food to improve the living standards of cadres and soldiers.

As for Army units, they should do the following:

All units should continue to bring into full play the results already obtained, overcome the remaining problems and shortcomings, take the initiative in carrying out, in an even better manner and more widely and deeply, their activities with the same contents and in the same forms as already implemented, thereby fulfilling their functions of "a working Army" in the new situation.

All units should always maintain their flesh-blood relationship with the people, listen to the people's opinions, and use propaganda and persuasion to enable the people to clearly understand the lines and policies of the party and state, to correctly perceive the nature, schemes, and tricks of all enemies, and to contribute to firmly maintaining political stability, consolidating the all-people national defense and people's security disposition, and defeating all current enemy "peaceful evolution" and subversive schemes and other schemes of military intervention. For this reason, mass agitation and Army-people unity must be considered an important theme of the plans to build stable and strong units and stable defense zones and to develop safe localities in order to actively cope with any eventuality.

—Army units should work out plans for coordination with localities in building stable and strong political bases and safe villages or village clusters. They should draw experience from jobs well done and carry them on, such as participating in and promoting closely coordinated actions under various combat plans from the provincial to the grass-roots level, under regional defense plans, under the plans for maintaining public security and order, under storm and flood prevention and control plans, and so forth. The safety cluster is an effective form of activity in the maintenance of order and security. All the Army units stationed in the province are members of safety clusters; many units have won the public's confidence and have been appointed cluster leaders. In these

safety clusters, duty hand-over, combat alert, guard duty... and other procedures are regularly maintained. When handing over their duties, cluster members inform each other of their resolution of various problems and agree on the themes and measures of the operations to be carried out in the future to maintain political security and social order and safety in their localities.

—Whenever there are disputes between a few citizens and a small number of soldiers, the key leaders of the localities and Army units concerned should meet, listen to the masses' views, and work together to find out the cause of the disputes and find ways to settle them in the spirit of "the Army and the people being of the same will." Whatever happens, they should never let bad people take advantage of such disputes to drive a wedge between the Army and the people.

—On the basis of the law, the province and various districts will join the comrades in charge of Army units to consider the plans for land use to ensure that the requirements of national defense consolidation are fully met, to guarantee absolute safety for Army projects, warehouses, barracks, and schools. At the same time, proper conditions should be created for a more effective planning of economic and production projects. Proper conditions should also be created for cadres and combatants of various units, for soldier families, and for the people in the areas concerned to develop production and improve their living standards.

From now on, leaders of various localities and Army units should meet—once every six months at the district level, and once a year at the provincial level—to exchange experience in order to ceaselessly raise the quality of the activities to promote "Army-people unity," thereby contributing to building localities and armed forces that are stable and strong in all respects.

Building Defense Zone in Thai Binh Province

932E0077A Hanoi TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN
DAN in Vietnamese June 93 pp 55-57

[Article by Colonel Nguyen Duc Hanh: "Five Years of Building a Defense Zone in Thai Binh Province"]

[Text] In the course of five years of fulfilling the mission of building a provincial (and municipal) defense zone, the soldiers and people of Thai Binh Province have attained encouraging initial results which have been manifested in the following specific aspects:

1. Building national defense by all the people, building a people's war battlefield deployment, contributing to maintaining political security, and being prepared to defeat all enemy sabotage plots and tricks.

There has been an improvement in the defense education task, which has enabled everyone to understand correctly the party's viewpoint and line of people's national defense, heighten their vigilance, and clearly recognize the enemy plots.

Along with teaching consciousness of national defense, Thai Binh at an early date creatively implemented the new mechanism of "The party leads, the government manages, and the military and public security organs serve as the staffs and provide unified command for the Armed Forces from the provincial level down to the basic level. It boldly created district (or city) military party committees to replace the party affairs committees. The province has implemented the structure of military party committees at the provincial and district levels, in which the secretary of the provincial party committee serves as secretary of the military party committee, the chairman of the people's committee serves as the deputy secretary in over-all charge, and the commander of the provincial military command committee serves as deputy secretary in charge of guiding the Armed Forces.

Bringing into play the combined strength of the sections, sectors, and localities in building the defense zone, the province always pays attention to combining economic construction with national defense and national defense with security in accordance with over-all provincial and district plans. The various echelons have continually guided the local military and security organs and have reviewed, supplemented, and amended the plans in a timely manner, so that they can be appropriate to the new combat objectives and the new situation and missions.

Especially, by fully applying the military region's slogan and viewpoint of concentrating on building up the basic levels the province, even though the situation has developed in a complicated manner, has been able to promptly resolve a number of "hot points" that have arisen. At present, the basic units have been stabilized, the movement is rather uniform, and social order and security have been assured.

With regard to building a local people's war battlefield deployment in the defense zone, the province has completed two-level (province and district) defense plans, which have also been completed in 70 percent of the villages and wards. The upper echelon has evaluated relatively highly the results of exercises in the provincial defense zone. It has completed exercises at all three levels—the provincial, district (municipal), and village (ward) levels—and has been praised by the Ministry of National Defense for being one of the first provinces to complete practical exercises based on the mechanism. The outstanding point of the exercises is that they closely combine testing the leadership with practice in mobilizing reserve troops and created harmonious and uniform activities among the three blocs (party, government, and military). Coordination and cooperation among the sectors in the defense zone have become increasingly close. It therefore can evaluate the combat readiness level of the local Armed Forces, the capability of the localities to mobilize reserve troops, the capability of military cadres at all levels to organize and command, the leadership, guidance, and management capabilities

of the local party committees and administrations, and the sectors' capabilities to support local people's war in the defense zone.

In order to implement the specific contents of the defense zone and ensure readiness to defeat the enemy in a large-scale war of aggression, the province drafted an over-all plan that ties in the economy with national defense and national defense with the economy, which ensures both service to the peacetime economy and mobilization to serve national defense when war breaks out. Interprovincial road arteries, and hundreds of kilometers of inter-district and inter-village roads, have been repaired or built. New bridges have been built on roads to the two forward districts (Thai Thuy and Tien Hai). The system of hospitals and clinics at the provincial and district levels has been strengthened so that it can care for the people's health in peacetime and be prepared to serve in wartime. The province has completed plans of the cantonment areas, the battlefield positions, and the command headquarters at all levels, and has gradually built the village combat bases, the rear services bases, etc. It has paid attention to all-round building—political, economics, and national defense. It has tied in building a strong countryside with building the defense zone. Achieving rich and strong villages is the basis on which to build a strong defense zone. The rural houses are being roofed with tile and electricity is being brought to the families to create a civilized way of life and new-culture families. It has rearranged and deployed the population, sent workers to the new economic zones along the seacoast, combined the program for building a new countryside with building combat villages, and gradually built a strong defense zone deployment to meet the short-range and long-range combat requirements.

2. Building local Armed Forces that are strong in all regards, have a high degree of combat readiness, and meet the needs of the revolutionary missions in the new situation.

Correctly understanding that the people's Armed Forces are the backbone of people's national defense, Thai Binh has paid attention to building comprehensively strong forces, including local troops, mobilized reserve troops, militia and self-defense forces, and border defense and security forces, in accordance with the guiding thoughts of being strong politically, ideologically, and organizationally, having good specialized skills, being skilled in organizing combat command, having a strong spirit of combat readiness, and outstandingly fulfilling all missions. It has paid attention to building military organs at all levels that know how to do staff work well and are creative and keen in guiding the fulfillment of missions.

With regard to local troops, it has concentrated on building them along streamlined, light, and strong lines so that they can truly serve as the backbone of the local Armed Forces. It essentially stabilized them with regard to organization and personnel and rearranged the cadres and military organs at all levels. It readjusted and streamlined a number of key units so that they could be

appropriate to the new situation, requirements, and missions, rotated and obtained benefits for nearly 1,000 cadres, and essentially rejuvenated the ranks of cadres. In addition to stabilizing organization and deploying forces, in recent years the provincial military command committee has carried out on a regular basis the task of bolstering the ranks of cadres at all levels and creating a pool of replacements. Every year the province holds one or two training classes, lasting one or two months, for the newly assigned cadres on the local military work.

As regards building mobilization reserve forces, the province has affirmed that that is "an important strategic mission that is both urgent and on-going." A mobilization reserve pool equal to eight percent of the province's population has been registered. The province's guidance slogan vis-a-vis the mobilization reserve forces is to "prepare sufficient numbers, be concerned with quality, and stress a high degree of readiness of the mobilization reserve forces." Villages prepare infantry companies and combat arm squads (or platoons). Village clusters have infantry battalions and combat arm companies. Districts have infantry regiments and combat arm battalions. In those units, the military specialist ratio is 82 percent, the party member ratio is 13 percent, and the ratio of officers who are experienced in combat and supporting combat is 49 percent. With regard to the militia and self-defense forces, the province's guidance slogan is "broadly based development, appropriate numbers, high quality, appropriate ratios in peacetime, and expansion in wartime. The organization scale is based on the hamlet or village administrative unit. There are mobile forces, on-the-spot forces, and rational combat arm detachments." The militia and self-defense forces have been arranged and organized essentially in accordance with a uniform scale throughout the province. In 1992 those forces accounted for 1.67 percent of the province's population.

Every year the province has organized one or two months of supplementary training for village (and ward) unit commanders on the local military work. Since 1990, every year the province has organized village (and ward) competitions to select skilled unit commanders and have thereby strengthened the military knowledge of the village (and ward) military cadres.

3. Implementing the Army's rear-area policies and building a network of people's rear-area services and local rear-area services.

Thai Binh is a province in which more than 70 percent of the families are families of troops. There are more than 50,000 families of war dead, nearly 20,000 disabled veterans, and tens of thousands of retired and disabled cadres. Although there are still many difficulties, the province always pays attention to the Army's rear-area work, with the slogan, "sincerity and thoroughness." The provincial party committee and administration have guided and led the echelons, sectors, and mass organizations in carrying out many movements with good results, such as the movements to "show gratitude," increase

savings, build "brotherhood" houses, care for seriously wounded troops at home, and take care of parents of war dead who have no means of support. The province gives priority to providing jobs to disabled veterans, demobilized troops, and troops who have completed their military service. With regard to troops on active duty, there are "servicemen's winter," "support the front," "the entire nation looks toward the border," and "for the beloved Paracels" movements. The province has the policy of giving priority to providing rice fields that are good and near-by, and exempting families of cadres and soldiers from some contributions. In addition, during the period between growing seasons, after natural disasters, on holidays, and during the Tet period, the echelons set aside hundreds of millions of dong to help the families who are beneficiaries of the policies, which has reduced the families' difficulties.

The results of those activities have greatly encouraged the families with members who sacrificed themselves for the nation and those with members who are fulfilling their military obligations, and have created among the people enthusiasm and peace of mind toward the mission of defending the homeland, and a spirit of working positively and contributing manpower and materiel in order to do a good job of fulfilling the troop recruitment, training, and combat readiness missions of the local Armed Forces. In addition to implementing the Army's rear area policies, every year the province provides tens of thousands of obligatory work days and spends hundreds of millions of dong for the national defense mission. Especially, Thai Binh is a province that at an early date had the People's Council discuss and decide upon creating a national defense fund in order to have additional sources of funds for the local military mission.

Production is also tied in with implementing the national defense missions. In recent years, the province's machine shops have received norms to produce such weapons as hand grenades, mines, AD-73 grenades, etc., and have attained high quality. Furthermore, the rear-services sector has guided, and coordinated with, the factories, enterprises, and cooperatives to form part-time weapons repair teams. Thai Thuy and Tien Hai districts have set up repair cells in the villages and part-time units in the districts, which receive supplementary specialized training in repairing weapons and are prepared to fulfill their missions as required.

The province also created favorable conditions for the local Armed Forces in the province to do economic work. It has authorized military forces to be used in weapons production installations to do economic work, has maintained national defense clothing enterprises, etc. The military installations that also do economic work have achieved results and every year create many valuable products, have incomes of hundreds of millions of dong, contribute to improving the troops' living conditions, and have additional sources of funds for the national defense work at the local level.

Initial, Future Tasks in Building Reserves

932E0070A Hanoi TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN
DAN in Vietnamese May 93 pp 18-22

[Article by Lieutenant General Do Van Duc: "Building the Mobilization-Ready Reserve Force—Some Lessons Learned From Initial Experiences and the Orientation and Tasks in the Years Ahead"]

[Text] In the recent years, implementing the resolutions of the party on national defense tasks and the decrees and decisions of the (former) Council of Ministers on Army mobilization work, various localities, state sectors, and Army units have carried out the task of building the mobilization-ready reserve force and have recorded important initial results, which serve as the basis for continuing the implementation of this task in the future. However, the results already obtained have still fallen short of the set requirements and tasks and there still are weaknesses, problems, and a number of issues that we must continue to study and resolve.

1. Some Lessons Learned From Initial Experiences

1. Deeply understanding the requirements and duties and upholding the awareness and responsibility of all levels, sectors, and mass organizations are the most important task in the process of carrying out the duty of building the mobilization-ready reserve force.

The cause of consolidating and building the all-people national defense system in general and building the mobilization-ready reserve force in particular is the responsibility of the entire party and people, and of all levels, sectors, and mass organizations. Therefore, the primary requirement is to enable all people and organizations to correctly perceive the important role and great significance of this task. In peacetime conditions, building the mobilization-ready reserve force is an important part of the task of consolidating and strengthening the national defense potential and safeguarding the lasting peace of our country; at the same time, we must make the country ready to fight against wars of aggression and must promptly deal with complicated situations to protect the regime and the revolutionary gains. This is a task that imposes high requirements in many respects and calls for urgent but constant, long-term implementation. Satisfactorily carrying out the task of building the mobilization-ready reserve force is an undertaking of great military and economic significance that will enable us to increase the Army's fighting strength while concentrating our force and wealth on national construction. Both theory and practice have shown that a full sense of responsibility and adequate investment for the task of building the mobilization-ready reserve force are possible only if there is a profound perception of this task.

In reality, over the past years, the results already obtained as well as the remainder weaknesses in the process of carrying out the task of building the mobilization-ready reserve force have stemmed from the way

this task was perceived. Owing to their thorough understanding of the situation and their tasks, and to their gradually improved perception, many party committee echelons and administrations in localities such as Ha Bac, Vinh Phu, Nam Ha, Thanh Hoa, Quang Nam-Danang, and Tien Giang Provinces, Hanoi Municipality, Ho Chi Minh City, and so forth, have exercised strict leadership and guidance and have made the necessary investment in the task of building the mobilization-ready reserve force. This has enabled these localities to obtain noticeable results despite the fact that they still had to concentrate their efforts on economic building and development in a situation rife with difficulties. On the contrary, a number of branches, organs, units, and localities have recorded very limited results because they have not had a full, profound perception of their duty, and because they have failed to uphold their sense of responsibility and to really apply themselves to this task.

2. Firmly grasping and efficiently applying the national defense leadership and management mechanism in accordance with Political Bureau Resolution 2 to the task of building the mobilization-ready reserve force.

Building the reserve force is a task consisting of motivating and organizing the masses to directly carry out and participate in Army building and national defense consolidation. This is a kind of work that directly affects the lives, thoughts, and feelings of the masses, and is related to many areas of social activities in localities. For this reason, it is absolutely necessary for all party committee echelons to lead this work, for the administration to manage it, for military organs to serve as the staff, and for all agencies and mass organizations to bring into full play their sense of responsibility.

In reality, recently, in those localities where the above-mentioned mechanism was fully implemented, the organizations in the political system were able to correctly fulfill their functions, to create all-people aggregate strength, to develop mass movements in villages and subwards, to gradually and steadily build defense zones, and to overcome numerous difficulties in registering, managing, and mobilizing reservists for training and military exercises, and in carrying out combat-readiness inspections. Thanks to this, better results have been recorded.

In the Army, organs and units were able to record better results if their party committee echelons exercised their leadership, commanders directly administered management, and the staff, political, logistic, technical, financial, and other organs brought into full play their sense of responsibility in carrying out the task of building the mobilization-ready reserve force.

3. Firmly grasping and applying the concepts of combat readiness, practicality, development, and economy to the task of building the mobilization-ready reserve force.

Our Army's combat strength is made up of the strength of the regular force and that of the reserve force. Not only the regular force must be built in such a way as to

ensure high quality, good capabilities, and a fine level of combat readiness, but the reserve force itself must also be developed in the same way, that is, it must also stand ready to be mobilized and to fight; and once mobilized, it must fight victoriously. This is both a goal to be achieved and a concept of combat readiness to be implemented in building the reserve force. Recently, those localities and units which held fast to this concept in building the reserve force and and which regarded quality and efficiency as the main objectives were able to display initiative and to apply numerous measures to gradually raise quality. There have been many typical Army and armed-branch units in this regard.

In organizing the building of the reserve force, we should study, carry on, and develop the old traditions and experience to suit them to our current conditions and real capabilities; at the same time, we should set a direction for our efforts and work out new measures to improve our efficiency in fulfilling the new requirements and tasks. Over the past years, it is thanks to their success in inheriting and developing the leadership and guidance experience of the party committees and administration at all levels, in bringing into full play the entire people's tradition of devoting themselves to building the Armed Forces, and in holding fast to and applying the concepts of practicality, development, and economy to the task of building the mobilization-ready reserve force, that many localities and units have been able to devise suitable forms of organization of mobilized units, to concentrate their building efforts on important units, and to build the reserve force from the lower to the higher level. Thanks to this, they have recorded noticeable initial results.

On the contrary, because of their failure to firmly grasp and apply the above-mentioned concepts to the task of building the mobilization-ready reserve force, some localities, units, and organs have succumbed to formalism, expending much effort and resources but achieving poor results.

4. Devotedly consolidating, strengthening, and improving the system of mobilization agencies to help the leadership and commanders fulfill their tasks.

To translate the direction and policy of building the reserve force and preparing for Army mobilization into results, aside from exercising leadership and guidance we must also carry out the organization of implementation by means of several concrete and fairly elaborate measures such as registering and managing the reserve force, drawing up mobilization plans, and making preparations in all fields for the actual mobilization of reservists, a task to be assumed by mobilization agencies and specialized and responsible cadres from the village level up. If we do not apply ourselves to consolidating, strengthening, and improving the system of organizations and cadres specializing in and responsible for mobilization, it would be difficult for us to fulfill our mobilization task in peacetime, and it would be even more difficult to do so when mobilization is imperative.

In reality, recently the mobilization agencies system brought its role into play by helping the leadership at various levels fulfill their tasks. For example, many mobilization agencies in various Army units, many provincial and district military organs, or the former Department 1 of the Ministry of Communications and Transportation, the Ministry of Building, and the General Department of Geology, had helped the heads of these ministries obtain relatively good results in building specialized reserve units and preparing for the mobilization of machinery and equipment. But, since the organization of the agencies specializing in mobilization was changed, many places have experienced difficulty. With their duties made heavier by the new mobilization procedures, various localities and state sectors will encounter even greater difficulties if the mobilization agencies system is not consolidated and strengthened.

5. Simultaneously implementing and closely combining political, ideological, organizational, and welfare tasks, and providing adequate funds for the task of building the mobilization-ready reserve force.

Each of the above-mentioned tasks occupies a particular position in—and has a particular significance for—the task of building the mobilization-ready reserve force; they are closely related and stimulate one another. As satisfactory fulfillment of one task would help promote another, all levels and sectors should fully carry out all necessary work within the limits of their responsibility.

In reality, recently, a lack of uniform plans, simultaneous implementation, and close coordination has led to poor results. It is perfectly right and highly essential to attach importance to propaganda and education, but an absence of adequate procedures and policies would make it difficult to create proper conditions for reservists to fulfill their duties. We may be able to mobilize the masses to participate in building the reserve force, but if our organizational work was unscientific and we had no appropriate building formula, it would be impossible for us to improve the overall quality of the mobilized units. Organizations may be set up, but if the funds for training and development were lacking, then it would be difficult to improve their quality. As the mobilization tasks are becoming increasingly weighty, a downsized system of agencies specializing in and responsible for mobilization would find it difficult to fulfill its tasks, and so forth. This state of affairs should be rectified as soon as possible, so that we may obtain the desired results in the new stage.

II. The Orientation and Task of Building the Mobilization-Ready Reserve Force in the Coming Years

In the comprehensive renovation undertaking being carried out in our country under the party leadership, our economy is advancing step by step. Thanks to the fact that our party committee echelons, administration, and people have a tradition of—and experience in—building the revolutionary Armed Forces, in the recent years we have obtained important initial results and have learned

precious lessons from our experiences in building the mobilization-ready reserve force. However, aside from that, there remain numerous difficulties stemming from the change of the socioeconomic management mechanism. As the economy is still incapable of promptly meeting the pressing requirements of the national defense task, we still have difficulty providing funds for the task of building the reserve force; the benefits systems and policies currently applied to soldiers on active duty, reservists, and their families still contain irrationalities that should be corrected and amended. This problem must also be resolved step by step in conformity with the general situation of society.

As the situation in the world and Southeast Asia is developing in extremely complicated fashion, the task of defending the fatherland and the regime demands that: "... While putting the task of national construction in the forefront, our people must always heighten their vigilance, consolidate their national defense, protect political security and social order and safety, defend their fatherland and revolutionary gains..." and that "we must build the people's Armed Forces of ever higher quality, build a revolutionary, regular People's Army that is to be modernized step by step and that is well-trained, with a rational organizational structure and troop strength. The overall quality and combat strength of this Army must be enhanced. We must build a powerful mobilization-ready reserve force that is well-trained and well-managed, and that can be quickly mobilized according to plan when necessary..." [Footnote 1] [*Documents of the Seventh National Party Congress of Delegates*, Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1991, pp 85,86]

Thus, the national defense task in general and the task of building the mobilization-ready reserve force in particular have become increasingly weighty, demanding stricter leadership and guidance. They also require that the aggregate strength of all the party, people, and Army be brought into full play to build an increasingly powerful mobilization-ready reserve force that has sufficient troop strength as stipulated by the force organization plans of the various armed branches and services. This force must have a high overall quality, sound political capability, high technical and tactical standards, and the capability to conduct joint combat operations. It must also have suitable equipment, material supplies, and technical know-how, and stand ready to fight and to successfully deal with all situations anticipated. The following major measures should be satisfactorily carried out:

1. Continuing to gain a profound understanding of one's tasks and effecting a new change in perception and responsibility.

It is necessary to promote a clearer perception of the current task of building the People's Army, which consist of building the regular force and reserve force. At the same time, we must consolidate the organization and improve the quality of both regular and reserve forces. It would be wrong and incomplete if either of these tasks

was neglected. At present, since the regular force is being maintained only at a necessary level, it must have high quality in order to meet the requirements of its tasks. As the necessary reserve force must be several times larger than the regular force, it must be built up step by step and its quality improved gradually. It would be a strategic error to make light of the building of the reserve force at this juncture. In the current situation, building the reserve force is aimed not only at holding this force in readiness to counter wars of aggression, but also at enabling it to join the other Armed Forces and the entire people in standing ready to oppose peaceful evolution and subversive rebellions, to protect the socialist regime, and to ensure political security and social order and safety in every area and locality. Only by achieving a full and profound perception of this matter will we be able to effect a new change in our sense of responsibility in order to make investment in terms of leadership and guidance that is commensurate with the strategic significance and importance of the task of building the mobilization-ready reserve force.

2. Organizing strict management and making mobilization work a regular practice from the grass roots up.

Building the Army in general and building the mobilization-ready reserve force in particular are a task of all the party, people, and Army. It is related to many aspects of social activities and must be carried out urgently but regularly and over a long period of time. As there are numerous difficulties and complexities in this task, extremely strict organization of management is required, and reserve force building must be turned into a regular practice from the grass roots up in various localities and Army units and in the agencies concerned of the state apparatus. It is necessary to take advantage of peacetime conditions to build and accumulate reserve forces and develop mobilization work into a regular practice. To help the leadership manage the national economy and Army mobilization work and turn it into a regular practice, there should be a system of specialized agencies and cadres equipped with a rational, stable, and highly professional staff.

We would like to suggest that the state should make studies and promulgate legal documents on the building of the mobilization-ready reserve force to make strict management possible. At the same time, the state should create conditions for all echelons, sectors, and social organizations and each citizen to satisfactorily fulfill their obligations concerning this task.

3. Changing the method of building the mobilization-ready reserve force in keeping with the comprehensive renovation of society.

The comprehensive renovation of society has a direct impact on the task of building the mobilization-ready reserve force; conversely, the building of the mobilization-ready reserve force must be closely linked with various forms of socioeconomic organizations and consistent with the socioeconomic management mechanism.

For this reason, we should continue to make studies in order to lay down regulations on registering and managing the manpower sources of mobilization, and to determine the procedures for organizing and training the reserve force, for building specialized reserve units, and for mobilizing the machinery and equipment of the national economy in conformity with the current socioeconomic situation.

We should carry out a division of labor and devolve to various levels the responsibility for building the mobilization-ready reserve force along the following line: determining mobilization areas according to the territorial divisions; delegating authority and responsibilities to various localities in conformity with their conditions and their best abilities; assigning to the Army's main-force units the responsibility to closely coordinate with localities in jointly building and training their own reserve forces; dividing responsibilities and laying down regulations on coordinated action between localities, Army units, and state establishments entrusted with mobilization targets; establishing regulations to ensure funding for the task of building the mobilization-ready reserve force, and dividing funding responsibility between the national defense budget and the local budget; amending and supplementing the benefits systems and policies concerning soldiers on active duty, reservists, and their families.... We must continue to study and perfect all these activities to further promote the cause of Army building, to meet the requirements, and to fulfill our tasks in the new situation.

New Method Used To Build Reserve Force

932E0071A Hanoi TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN DAN in Vietnamese May 93 pp 34-36

[Article by Major General Nguyen Van Rin: "'Instant Duplication'—A Method of Building the Reserve Force at the Huong Giang Corps"]

[Text] Since 1991, the Huong Giang Corps has been officially entrusted by the Ministry of National Defense with the task of studying the application of another new method of building the reserve force: the "instant duplication" (1x2) method. The main content of this method is: *making all the necessary preparations for splitting a peacetime full-strength unit into two units in wartime.*

To be precise, this is not a totally new method. It had been applied during the years of the anti-U.S. war of resistance. What is new here is that it has to be implemented in a new situation and under new conditions, when regular Army units are not overstaffed with cadres, specialists, and technicians as they were during the war years.

The most difficult thing for a unit applying the "instant duplication" method is that it is required to perform all the regular duties of a full-strength regular Army unit while making preparations in all fields to ensure that the second unit will "come into being" when the order is given. These two tasks are always closely linked with

each other and run through all activities of a unit. The mobilization task of a unit can be considered accomplished only when the formation of the second unit is completed, or, to be more accurate, when the first unit may go back to taking care of itself to ensure that it is capable of operating regularly or participating in combat activities.

We can figure the very many things the first unit has to do right in peacetime to ensure the "birth" of the second. These range from building the cadre frame to participating in preparing for the development of manpower sources for mobilization, and for the building of operational positions as well as the provision of material supplies, logistic, technical, financial support....

Not until 1992 did the Huong Giang Corps apply this method up to the divisional level, an application that included organizing a rehearsal of mobilization work at battalion level. As we see it, for various units, a matter of utmost importance is *preparing cadres and effecting cadre frame separation*. Studies and calculations have shown that the first division must provide the second with about one-third of officers from the battalion-level up and with specialized and technical personnel for all key units and organs. Unlike the cases in which a standing cadre frame or compact cadre frame is already in existence, in the case of the Huong Giang Corps, with the number of officers belonging to its regular staff (plus a component it may keep in reserve or request from the upper echelon), the corps must make calculations and preparations in such a rational way as to ensure that, after separation, both cadre frames would have enough officers to fill the necessary positions, especially those of leading cadres and key assistants and personnel. These frames must be capable of operating according to the requirements of their tasks before long.

Recently, the Huong Giang Corps was allowed to apply the following formula in preparing for the splitting of cadre frames: *At the divisional level*, commanding officers were detached from the first division and administrative organs of the corps (the division commander, the deputy division commander in charge of political affairs, the deputy division commander serving as chief of staff... in particular were picked from the first division). Regarding administrative-organs cadres, they were mainly transferees from the first division, but some key section chiefs and assistants were culled from various administrative organs of the corps, and a small number of reserve officers were called up to fill vacancies (but cadres of those organs directly involved in the second division's operations from the beginning—such as the personnel, mobilization organization, logistic, financial, and technical organs—were definitely selected from the first division). *At the regimental level*, commanding officers were detached from the first regiment and a number of divisional organs, and maybe even from the corps and the bloc of schools. Cadres of the administrative organs of the second regiment and subordinate units consisted mainly of transferees from the first regiment; at the same time, reserve officers were also mobilized to

serve in these positions. *At the battalion and company levels*, commanding officers were transferred from the first battalion and company; as for the positions from deputy battalion commander down, reserve officers were drafted to fill them. Transfers of specialized and technical personnel were carried out in the same way as, and at the same time with, the transfers of officers.

After separation, the first division lacked one-third of officers, specialists, and technicians. These vacancies would be filled by personnel promoted from lower ranks or by mobilized reserve officers to ensure that the division was capable of operating and fighting without delay.

As for the second division, it was authorized to receive one-third of its officers, specialists, and technicians from the first division or from the corps; and the vacant positions would be fully filled, as required, by reserve officers figured on the division's roster. The officers transferred from the first division would assume the position of commander from the company level up. Reserve officers would be appointed deputy commanders and fill some positions of assistants to regiment and division commanders. After its formation, the second division could assume combat duties after undergoing supplementary training for 15 days to one month.

The moment at which the second division was to be separated from the first was when the mobilization order was issued, and separation must be completed at H-hour after the order was handed down. From that moment onward, the corps began to take command of the second division. Immediately after the cadre frame was split, the second division urgently got down to receiving mobilized personnel. This reception was carried out in two stages: one involving the source of initial reinforcements, the other involving the source of basic supplementary manpower. The initial reinforcements accounted for 10 percent of the total number of mobilized officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men. The purpose of this initial mobilization was to enable the newly formed division to carry out its immediate duties, the most urgent being to create favorable conditions for the reception of manpower from the basic supplementary source. Two or three days after that, the division continued to receive personnel from the basic supplementary source of manpower for mobilization. Owing to the large size of this source (which accounted for 90 percent of the mobilized personnel) and to the great urgency of the task, careful planning and tight, rational, and scientific organization were required. At the divisional level, four reception stations were usually set up (three stations for the three infantry regiments, one station for the administrative organs of the division and its subordinate units). In the process of receiving mobilized manpower, secrecy must be maintained, plans must be drawn up for the organization of air defense and chemical defense forces, and for a careful preparation of equipment and defense works to prevent the enemy from attacking the assembly areas.

Owing to the fact that the newly formed division will have to take command of mobilization work at once, the cadres expected to be transferred to the second division, especially the key and commanding cadres of units, must devote adequate time (maybe three to four months, depending on each individual and position) right in peacetime, before the cadre frame is split, to doing the work of the second unit, the unit they would take over in the future. It is absolutely necessary for them to know their future subordinate cadres and personnel well; at the same time they must have a thorough grasp of mobilization plans and foresee the advantages and difficulties that may materialize in the mobilization process so as to direct mobilization work well, to stabilize their units at an early date, and to carry out training and joint training as fast as they can, thereby ensuring combat readiness and the ability to fight victoriously.

The length of time for supplementary training should be determined according to the situation, the requirements of one's tasks, and the quality of reservists. Recent experiences have shown that a minimum period of 15 days to one month of training is usually needed to ensure combat capability. The supplementary training stage is really useful only if we have satisfactorily carried out the regular annual training of reservists.

To guarantee their quality, we must see to it that 65 percent or more of reservists are assigned to duties that exactly match their military specialties, and that 20 percent or more are appointed to positions that nearly correspond to their specialties. We should not carry out training for the purpose of transferring reservists from one armed branch to another, since such an effort would only have a formalist character and low quality owing to the extremely short period of time involved. In our opinion, reservists should be organized for formal training; and the best way is to send them to provincial military schools or Army units for training. If they are retained in localities for training, the localities concerned should only assume the tasks of organization, management, and making training plans, and maybe even the formulation of training content and programs; as for the task of teaching, there must be the participation of the units that would eventually receive these reservists. But it is absolutely necessary for the reservists-receiving units to assume the task of training cadres for the various armed branches and important technical personnel, and the task of formulating the content, programs, and plans of mobilization rehearsals.

In 1992, after building an experimental battalion according to the "instant duplication" method, the Huong Giang Corps organized field exercises for a total period of 10 days during which live ammunition was used, recording satisfactory results. Specifically, it took the battalion six hours to complete cadre frame separation after the mobilization order was issued. The battalion wound up the mobilization of reservists (in seven villages of District K, Province H) and the stabilization of its personnel and organization within 72 hours. In all, 100 percent of the battalion's personnel were present,

with 77.2 percent of them appointed to positions exactly corresponding to their military specialties, 9.2 percent assigned to duties nearly matching their specialties, and 13.4 percent not employed in accordance with their specialized military training. Party members and youth union members accounted for 16 percent and 45.8 percent of the battalion's personnel respectively.

This was only the results recorded in the mobilization of one battalion. As such, they cannot be used as a criterion for judging the performance of the entire division. Nevertheless, it was a realistic basis for the Huong Giang Corps to make preliminary appraisals of this "instant duplication" mobilization method. Initial comparison of this method with others currently used by the corps has shown that this method has many good points. For example, compared with the method of building the reserve force by means of a standing cadre frame, the "instant duplication" method helps reduce by more than 800 the number of officers and specialized and technical personnel. The "instant duplication" method can be applied when a unit still has to carry out its regular duties at the same time. Thanks to the fact that there is no need to set up a separate cadre frame like the standing cadre frame, the shortcomings of cadres "spending official time attending to personal affairs" and "lagging behind" are prevented and the quality of the cadre frame will be improved. In our opinion, compared with other methods, in particular the method of organizing a standing cadre frame, the "instant duplication" method is much more suitable for the mobile military corps. It is precisely because of this fact that we should study ways to organize our current mobile military corps in appropriate fashion to enable them to fulfill all the tasks of maintaining combat readiness and building their mobilization-ready reserve forces. To us, the most obvious thing is that the standing cadre frame should not be maintained in the mobile military corps.

Some Measures To Build Reserve Force

932E0068A Hanoi TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN
DAN in Vietnamese May 93, pp 37-39

[Article by Senior Lieutenant Colonel Le Dung Sam]

[Text] The mobilization sources (including reserve officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men and the technical facilities of the national economy) are the most important bases for drafting mobilization plans. If we do not fully understand the sources, and especially if we cannot create them and build them up, we cannot draft mobilization plans and therefore cannot carry out mobilization.

In recent years, with the close guidance of the Ministry of National Defense and the positive efforts of the units and localities, especially at the district and equivalent levels, initial results have been achieved in creating and building up the mobilization sources and a basis has been created for drafting the mobilization plans, for

training, and for mobilization exercises, but many places will have to make even greater efforts to fulfill those requirements.

With regard to measures for creating and building up the mobilization sources, there are still many different opinions in many places in actual implementation. In order to contribute to clarifying the basic measures in creating and building up the sources, we would like to present the following opinions:

I. Close Cooperation Between the Mobilization Areas and Annual Troop Recruitment

Mobilization and troop recruitment are closely related, especially the relationship between the mobilization area and troop recruitment, for troop recruitment is the basis for creating sources for building mobilization reserve units. Cooperation between the mobilization areas and troop recruitment is the most appropriate and scientific measure for creating a mobilization pool. That measure ensures both the quantity and quality of the mobilization sources and the units of the Armed Forces and technical branches.

The localities and units recruit troops every year by implementing the military obligation law. The number of troops recruited by a unit (military region, Armed Forces branch, combat arm, or corps) depends on plans drafted by the Ministry of National Defense and assigned to the localities and units. After three years, most of the citizens who serve in the Armed Forces are demobilized and return to the localities, then register as reserves (Class 1 reserves) so that they can, in turn, be assigned to the mobilization reserve units. Evaluation of the quality and mobilization readiness capabilities of the mobilization reserve units must be based on many factors, but the primary, most important factor is that the Class 1 reserves and those assigned to the right military specialties must account for a high ratio. To attain those requirements, the foremost and least expensive measure is close cooperation between the mobilization areas and annual troop recruitment. Recently, many localities have implemented that measure and have attained initial results, but it has not become a regular practice and cooperation has not been close. Some places have not paid it adequate attention. Therefore, over a rather long period (several decades) of troop recruitment one district has assigned a combat arm company to a village cluster but still has not attained the specified ratio of properly assigned military specialists. The situation of some places having many specialists of a certain category and other places having few or none is rather widespread. Therefore, even if a province does not have a shortage, a district, village cluster, village, etc., does not have the necessary number of military specialists to assign to mobilization reserve units.

In order to overcome that situation, every year, when troop recruitment norms are assigned by the Ministry of National Defence to the districts, attention must be paid to coordination between the mobilization areas and

troop recruitment. Specifically, the localities, especially the district (or equivalent) level, must firmly grasp the mobilization mission, the number of Class 1 reserves, the number who have been assigned to the mobilization reserves, etc., in order to know the current military specialist shortages (the shortages must be calculated on a two or three year basis) and report to the province so that it can draft plans for submission to the upper echelon, in order to draft plans to assign annual troop recruitment norms.

For example, district A is responsible for organizing a combat engineer mobilization reserve battalion in a village cluster (five or six villages). The district has a considerable shortage of combat engineer military specialists. Therefore, when recruiting troops every year the district makes a recommendation to the province and the province reports to the military region, which assigns the norm of recruiting a combat engineer unit of the military unit (or Ministry) in district A. (Of course, district A assigns to five or six villages responsibility for recruiting combat engineers.) By doing so, after two years there will be a pool of combat engineer military specialists to supplement the mobilization reserve units.

II. Training Class 2 Reserves To Become Class 1 Reserves

At present, Class 2 reserves account for a considerable ratio of the total number of reserves in the localities. A rather large number of the Class 2 reserves are in the Group A age bracket, are healthy, are educated, have technical specialties, etc., but have not served on active duty so their military level is still low, so most have not been assigned to mobilization reserve units. A very large number of reserves are needed to assign to mobilization reserve units to meet the requirements of mobilization, especially in the event of large-scale war. Therefore, the measure of creating and building up sources by training Class 2 reserves so that they can become Class 1 reserves is essential and must receive proper attention from the localities.

Recently, not much has been accomplished in that regard—indeed, some localities have not truly paid attention to it—and there are still many deficiencies, even in registration and management. Guidance from above regarding the training contents, time, and methods is not yet specific and funds to support training have not been clearly decentralized, so little has been accomplished in training, which has resulted in some localities and units not attaining the specified quantity and quality when assigning reserves to the mobilization reserve units.

Article 37 of the Military Obligation Law states that "Male military personnel in the Class 2 reserve category who have received 12 months of concentrated training may be upgraded to Class 1."

To carry out that task well, it is especially important that the district echelon firmly grasp the Class 2 reserve

category and designate those who are fully qualified for mobilization (in the Group A age bracket, have good health and good educational levels, possess the necessary specialties, etc., and give them first priority in training.) Appropriate plans should be drafted on the basis of the numbers of reserves who must be assigned to mobilization reserve forces (there is currently a shortage) and the training funds situation.

There are many different measures to create sources along those lines. For example, Tien Giang, Long An, Dong Thap, etc. over a period of more than 10 years have organized many economic-national defense units to bring together youths who are in the military obligation age bracket but have not yet been able to fulfill their obligations in the provincial and district economic-national defense units. Every year they organize concentrated military training in accordance with programs and contents stipulated by the province. After a period of three years of service in the economic-national defense units those youths have military knowledge and life styles corresponding to Class 1 reserve troops, so they may be assigned to the mobilization reserve units. The localities that do not have conditions for rallying youths in the military obligation age bracket may be trained by the following methods:

Organizing regular training periods every year (one month of training per year, depending on the local situation), and the districts drafting plans and organizing training for each village cluster, in correct accordance with a program specified by the upper echelon. After 12 months, decisions are made about transfers to Class 1.

By doing so, every year the districts considerably increase the number of Class 1 reserves with which to supplement the mobilization reserve units of the provinces and military regions.

III. Training in a Different Combat Arm or Training Military Personnel To Become Noncommissioned Officers Before They Are Demobilized

Demobilized troops are the primary source of supplementation for the mobilization reserve units. Nearly all of them are in the Group A age bracket, are healthy, have good educational, political, and military levels, etc., and have been steered and challenged in work and combat. At present, the number of troops demobilized every year is considerable but the number of people with the necessary military specialties who return to the localities are distributed very unevenly and the requirements for assigning military specialties to the mobilization reserve units are still not fulfilled. Therefore, combat arm retraining to meet local needs, or training military personnel to become command noncommissioned officers before demobilization are temporarily regarded as necessary measures in creating and building up mobilization sources. Those measures should not be carried out on an excessively large scale and "training from scratch" should be completely avoided, especially in training key

military specialists of the Armed Forces and technical branches. Only those whose military specialists are close to those needed, or who have obtained a certain amount of knowledge about the specialty should receive training in a different military branch. The length of the training period should depend on the category, the requirements and missions, and the specific situations of the units and localities. In order to assign and use them effectively in the future, there must be unified, close guidance according to plans from the General Staff level down to the district level. Meanwhile, we must resolutely attain the training norms and train for the right place (a district or a village.)

Every year the districts, on the basis of the mobilization mission, the military specialist situation (especially the military specialties that are needed by the mobilization reserve units but are in short supply), and the number of military personnel on active duty (the number who enlist every year in each regular unit), draft plans to request that the upper echelon train appropriate numbers. If the district has a continuing relationship with a regular unit that receives troops from it, it may take the initiative in holding discussions with the unit (at the division or equivalent level) in order to have a basis on which to draft a training plan and submit it to the upper echelon for approval.

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